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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Macroeconomics
by
Duksang Cho
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2016
Professor Yongseok Shin, Chair
My dissertation is centered on economic heterogeneity endogenously derived from market
imperfections or changes in technology. By introducing specific assumptions that capture a
market imperfection or a change in technology, I study how the economic realities can affect
resource distributions and aggregate outcomes in an equilibrium.
Chapter 1 studies the economic impacts of business groups by focusing on their pyrami-
dal ownership structure given capital market imperfections. An entrepreneur can alleviate
financial frictions by creating a pyramidal business group in which a parent firm offers its sub-
sidiary firm internal equity finance. This endogenous creation of pyramidal business groups
can beget asymmetric financial frictions between business-group and stand-alone firms. I
build a model to show that these asymmetric financial frictions can have sizable effects on
resource allocation. On one hand, the financial advantage of pyramidal business groups can
foster productive firms by incorporating subsidiaries. On the other hand, the asymmetrically
large amount of external capital controlled by pyramidal business groups can push up the
price of capital and hinder the growth of stand-alone firms. The model suggests that pyra-
ix
midal business groups can improve the factor allocation of an economy with poor investor
protection in which external capital markets are underdeveloped, but worsen the factor al-
location of an economy with fine investor protection in which excessive capital is used up by
unproductive business-group firms.
Chapter 2 investigates consequence of declining labor shares in manufacture. I show that
a Cobb-Douglas production function can be generated with a technology that substitutes
capital for labor and decreases labor shares. A simple two-sector model is used to examine
consequences of declining labor shares. The model suggests that a declining labor share in
manufacture can be accompanied with an increase in the labor productivity dispersion, a
decrease in the labor price, and an increase in the land price.
Chapter 3 researches the possibility that changes in the number of households simul-
taneously purchasing durable goods can create a business cycle. Heterogeneous timings of
durable goods purchases are examined as an extensive margin of aggregate consumption. I
develop a model in which each household holds money to purchase durable goods and opti-
mizes its purchase timing given adjustment costs. The model shows that a shock common
to all households such as a change in the expected inflation rate or government transfers can
synchronize durable goods purchases across households. I argue that altering the number
of households simultaneously purchasing durable goods can generate a sizable, long- lasting
business cycle without the help of sticky prices or shocks to TFP.
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Chapter 1
Pyramidal Business Groups and
Asymmetric Financial Frictions
1.1 Introduction
A pyramidal business group is a collection of legally independent corporations controlled
by a coterie of shareholders. It is a common ownership structure for a country’s largest
firms, with exceptions of some countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom.1
The economy-wide repercussions of pyramidal business groups, however, have been unclear
although they are salient economic institutions too sizable to be ignored. For instance,
pyramidal business groups in South Korea not only have been acclaimed as engines of growth
for the country’s fast development but also have been the subjects of controversy for their
1La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) examine 27 wealthy countries and show that most of the
largest corporations in a country are business groups controlled by families or the state through pyramidal
ownership schemes. La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) argue that the degree of investor
protection is closely related to the corporate governance structure and that business groups are common in
countries with poor investor protection. Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011) examine 28,635 listed firms in
45 countries, including developing economies, and reaffirm that pyramidal business groups are a common
ownership structure around the world. They show that the prevalence of business groups is negatively
associated with the capital availability of an economy, but insignificantly associated with the degree of
investor protection. They argue that business groups emerge in order to alleviate financial frictions.
1
economic concentration.2
In this paper, I build a model of pyramidal business groups in a general equilibrium
framework and aim to answer a question: Can pyramidal business groups affect the efficiency
of an economy? I focus on a pyramidal ownership structure, which arises due to capital
market imperfections and gives rise to asymmetric financial frictions between business-group
and stand-alone firms.3
Built on the span of control model developed by Lucas (1978), two assumptions are
introduced. First, I assume that the investor protection of an economy is imperfect so that
a firm’s ability to raise external capital is constrained.4 I assume a limited commitment
problem such that an entrepreneur controlling his or her firms can divert τ fraction of the
firms’ cash flow before outside investors are reimbursed. In the model, this realized diversion
keeps the expected rate of return on external equity finance identical to the risk-free interest
rate. Thus, an entrepreneur can earn positive profits as the private benefits of control and
have an incentive to create a business group with flotation costs. Note that a common
implementation of financial frictions in the literature hinges on an out-of-equilibrium path
and that the diversion does not occur in an equilibrium.
Second, I allow for a business group as a private means that can alleviate financial
frictions. A business group is defined as a collection of two firms connected through a
pyramidal ownership structure such that a business-group entrepreneur controls a parent
firm that controls a subsidiary firm. There is no limited commitment problem between the
parent and the subsidiary because both firms are controlled by the common entrepreneur.
Thus, the parent can offer internal finance as much as possible to the subsidiary without
2As of 2004 in South Korea, business groups controlled by a few families hold 56% of market capitalization
in the country according to Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011).
3Given the fact that a business group is a dominant ownership structure of the largest corporations in a
country, this study revisits a question raised by many others: if the size distribution of firms in a country
affects its economic efficiency.
4e.g. Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011)
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financial frictions. Specifically, the financial advantage of a pyramidal business group in the
model is twofold. Not only does the subsidiary use its internal equity finance offered by
the parent as leverage to raise external capital, but also the parent uses its equity shares of
the subsidiary as leverage to raise external capital. Thus, it is the financial advantage of a
business group that makes it possible for an entrepreneur to build up a business group as a
competitive ownership structure in an equilibrium.
The model shows that business groups can have non-monotonic impact on resource allo-
cation given the degree of financial frictions. In an economy with poor investor protection,
the internal capital markets of business groups substitute for underdeveloped external capi-
tal markets and foster financially constrained but productive firms. A numerical example of
the model shows that the rich become business-group entrepreneurs by hiring the poor but
talented as business-group managers. It also shows that an economy with business groups
accumulates larger capital stock than an economy without business groups because the rich
save more in order to create business groups featuring internal capital markets. This im-
plies that business groups can be efficient private institutions at the early stage of economic
development where financial frictions are rampant.
In an economy with fine investor protection, however, the asymmetric financial frictions
between business-group and stand-alone firms become a source of resource misallocation.
The rich but unproductive choose to create business groups despite flotation costs because
they can earn ex-ante positive profits by incorporating productive subsidiaries, while their
ex-post profits can be negative because the probability of launching productive subsidiaries
declines with the rising managerial compensation as investor protection improves. Moreover,
business-group entrepreneurs use their financial advantage to consume more and save less
by raising a larger amount of external capital without increasing net capital in production.
Thus, the larger demand and the lower supply of capital push up the price of capital in an
equilibrium and force stand-alone entrepreneurs, most of whom are financially constrained, to
3
raise less external capital, produce less, and consume less. The numerical example shows that
the stand-alone entrepreneurs’ wealth drops significantly and that an economy dominated
by business groups features decreasing capital stock and stagnating aggregate consumption
as the fraction of diversion τ goes to zero.
An interesting lesson we can learn from the model is that the relative number of business-
group firms does not decrease endogenously with the improvement of investor protection.
This result is consistent with Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011) who report an insignificant
association between the prevalence of family business groups and the degree of investor
protection. Given the observation that the direction of effects business groups have on an
economy is reversed as investor protection improves, the unvarying number of business-
group firms implies that mitigating capital market imperfections may barely reduce factor
misallocation or even worsen it without due consideration of pyramidal business groups,
which are prevalent in many economies including developed countries.
Although I simplify the problem of business groups by focusing on the financial advantage
of their internal capital markets, there is a larger pool of questions about business groups that
should be examined such as monopoly, political economy, risk sharing, or intangible assets of
business groups. For example, Khanna and Yafeh (2007) review the issues of business groups
and conclude that their origins and effects are largely unknown. Note that the objective of
this paper is to narrow down the problem and understand a trait of business groups, their
internal capital markets, in a general equilibrium framework.
In the literature, the pyramidal ownership structure of a business group has been under-
stood with two different viewpoints. First, a traditional view is that it is an expropriation
device. The main argument of this view is that the pyramidal ownership structure cre-
ates discrepancy between ownership and control. Although the controlling shareholder of a
business group, typically a family, owns a small portion of shares of business-group affili-
ates, its pyramidal scheme allows the family to take control over the business group and to
4
earn the private benefits of control at the expense of other shareholders. This separation of
ownership from control can generate agency problems, resource misallocation, and economic
entrenchment. See Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) for the review of this perspective.
Second, more recent studies examine pyramidal business groups as start-up breeders.
They focus on the role of business groups that offer internal finance to start-up firms and
help them grow larger by supplementing the inefficiency of external capital markets. Almeida
and Wolfenzon (2006b) offer a theory of business groups based on the financial advantage
of pyramidal business groups. In their model, the controlling shareholder of a parent firm
uses the firm’s retained earnings to launch a subsidiary firm that provides cash flow to the
controlling shareholder. Despite the discrepancy between ownership and control, business
groups can be economically beneficial because subsidiary firms would be dismissed without
the help of internal capital markets due to setup costs that cannot be raised from external
capital markets given financial frictions. Bena and Ortiz-Molina (2013) use data from 38
European countries and show that business groups do play a significant role in creating new
firms.
These two perspectives on pyramidal business groups are not mutually exclusive. They
are rather opposite sides of the same coin, in that the first can cause the second. The oppor-
tunity to earn additional cash flow from a subsidiary firm is an incentive for the controlling
shareholder of a parent firm, which offers internal finance and helps to launch its subsidiary
firm.
A natural question arises. Between these two viewpoints, which aspect of business groups
is dominant? Simply put, are business groups good or bad for an economy? In spite of its
relevance, the answer has been unclear. This is because most researchers have focused on the
internal efficiency of an individual business group. Few researchers have developed models
of business groups in a general equilibrium framework.
Among them, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006a) show that the financial advantage of busi-
5
ness groups can cause asymmetric financial frictions between business-group firms and stand-
alone firms, which results in factor misallocation in an equilibrium. Despite its novel insight,
their model is stylized so that it is hard to capture dynamic aspects of an economy allowing
for forward-looking behaviors of individuals such as savings or self-financing. This can be
a problem if we want to examine the economic impact of the asymmetric financial frictions
because the wealth distribution of an economy is endogenously determined by the agents’ dy-
namic optimization, which might undo factor misallocation steming from financial frictions
(e.g. Moll (2014)).
Ševčík (2015) examines the economic impact of business groups using a heterogeneous
agent model with financial frictions, in which the wealth distribution of an economy is
endogenously determined. He studies to what extent internal capital markets of business
groups can alleviate financial frictions and concludes that aggregate output in Canada would
be reduced by 3% if its business groups were shut down. Business groups in his model,
however, are partnerships rather than pyramids. This can be a problem if we want to
examine the economic repercussions of pyramidal business groups that feature the separation
of ownership from control. Specifically, in his model the degree of financial frictions captured
by the ratio of capital to wealth is a given constant identical to all firms, while in my model
the ratio is endogenously determined and business-group entrepreneurs leverage their wealth
into control over capital worth vastly more through a pyramidal ownership structure.
In order to deal with these limitations, I introduce the following feature in my model.
First, each individual chooses his or her consumption, savings, and occupation every period.
Thus, the joint distribution of individuals’ wealth and occupation is endogenously deter-
mined. Second, an individual who chooses to be an entrepreneur also chooses his or her
firms’ ownership structure. I connect corporate capital structures with corporate ownership
structures given capital market imperfections. A pyramidal business group is introduced as
a private means of an entrepreneur alleviating financial frictions. Thus, asymmetric financial
6
frictions among firms arise from the endogenous choice of firms’ ownership structure.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I introduce an individual’s
problem of occupational choices given the heterogeneity in managerial talent and wealth
throughout the population. Every period, each individual chooses his or her occupation
among a worker, a stand-alone entrepreneur, a business-group entrepreneur, and a manager
who can be hired by a business-group entrepreneur.
In Section 3, financial frictions and three types of capital markets such as external debt,
external equity, and internal equity markets are specified. These three types of capital mar-
kets are used to build up three types of firms: a private company, a publicly held corporation,
and a pyramidal business group. This variety of firms’ ownership structures captures private
institutions stemming from agents’ endogenous reactions against capital market imperfec-
tions, which generates asymmetric financial frictions among firms in the model.
In Section 4, a stationary equilibrium is defined by introducing a matching rule between
a business-group entrepreneur and a manager. In Section 5, I remark on the model. The
costs and benefits of pyramidal business groups are discussed. In Section 6, a numerical
example of the model is constructed and the results of the model are presented. In Section
7, a firm-level dataset of South Korea is examined to check the model. Lastly in Section 8,
I discuss the limitation of the model and propose future research.
1.2 A Heterogeneous Agent Model with Occupational
Choices
1.2.1 Economic Environment
An economy consists of infinitely lived individuals. Every period, each individual is endowed
with an indivisible labor force and characterized by his or her own managerial talent z that
7
changes over periods following a Markov chain.5 Let’s assume that an individual consumes
out of his or her own wealth a such that c ∈ [0, a] and that a utility function u(c) satisfies
standard conditions such that u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0, and limc→0 u′(c) =∞.
Given (z, a), an individual chooses his or her next period occupation o(z, a) among a
worker (W ), a stand-alone entrepreneur (SA), or a business-group entrepreneur (BG). At
the beginning of the next period, a worker sells his or her indivisible labor force and earns
wage w, and an entrepreneur runs a firm and earns from the firm’s stochastic cash flow pi.
An entrepreneur raises her firm’s capital k given (z, a). At the beginning of the next
period, the entrepreneur observes a shock to the managerial talent z′ and hires labor ` given
k.6 Then, the firm produces cash flow pi that is defined as the optimized gross output net of
labor costs w` and capital depreciation δ′k such that
pi (z′, δ′|z, k) = max
`
z′kα`θ − w`+ (1− δ′)k, α, θ > 0, α + θ < 1 (1.1)
where α+θ < 1 is a span of control shaping the production function into decreasing returns to
scale. Suppose that the capital depreciation rate δ′ ∈ (0, 1) is a random variable independent
of z′.
A stand-alone entrepreneur can run either a private company or a publicly held corpora-
tion. A private company is a firm fully owned by its stand-alone entrepreneur, which raises
capital from external debt markets. A publicly held corporation can be incorporated by
its stand-alone entrepreneur who pays flotation costs kF . It can raise capital from external
equity markets as well as external debt markets.
A business group is defined as a collection of two corporations: a parent that offers
5An exogenous process of managerial talents can be understood as a parsimonious way of capturing
the impact of financial frictions on factor allocations by abstracting away from the endogenous nature of
managerial talents. In Section 6, I will specify a state space and a transition probability of managerial talent
z.
6We can think of this timing structure, raising k given z and then producing cash flow pi after observing
z′, as an entrepreneur’s investment decision taking risks.
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internal equity finance and a subsidiary that receives internal equity finance. An individual
of (z1, a1)7, who chooses to be a business-group entrepreneur o(z1, a1) = BG, runs the parent
with z1 and hires a manager of (z2, a2) who runs the subsidiary with z2. The business-group
entrepreneur can choose z2, while a2 is randomly drawn with probability PBG (z2, a2). The
business-group entrepreneur earns from both firms’ cash flow at the beginning of the next
period.
An individual of (z, a), who chooses to be a worker or a stand-alone entrepreneur o(z, a) ∈
{W,SA}, can be matched to a business-group entrepreneur with probability PM(z, a). If the
matching is realized, the individual becomes a manager and earns managerial compensation
wM(z, a) at the beginning of the next period. Note that the managerial compensation wM
is a function of (z, a) that are pinned down when the matching is realized, even though the
subsidiary firm’s production will be realized with z′ next period.
Figure 1.1 summarizes the timing of an individual’s problem within a period. Given
(z, a), firstly an individual chooses his or her occupation, secondly the matching between
business-group entrepreneurs and the others are realized, and lastly output is produced with
realized shocks to managerial talents z′ at the beginning of the next period.
Figure 1.1: Time-line of an Individual’s Problem Within a Period
7I use (z1, a1) instead of (z, a) because (z1, a1) is convenient for comparing a parent’s managerial talent
z1 indexed by 1 to a subsidiary’s managerial talent z2 indexed by 2.
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1.2.2 An Individual’s Problem
Every period, each individual solves the following problem given his or her managerial talent
z and wealth a such that
V (z, a) = max
o∈{W,SA,BG}
{
V W (z, a), V SA(z, a), V BG(z, a)
}
(1.2)
given
{
r, w, wM(z, a), PM(z, a), PBG(z2, a2)
}
, which respectively stand for the rate of return
on capital, wage for a worker, managerial compensation, the probability of being matched
with a business-group entrepreneur, and the probability of being matched with a manager
featuring (z2, a2).
V W (z, a) is the value if an individual chooses to be a worker such that
V W (z, a) =
(
1− PM(z, a)
)
· V W0 (z, a) + PM(z, a) ·max
{
V W0 (z, a), V M(z, a)
}
,
V W0 (z, a) = max
s∈[0,a]
u(a− s) + βEz′ [V (z′, w + (1 + r)s)| z]
(1.3)
where s is the risk-free asset matured in the next-period with interest rate r.
V M(z, a) is the value if an individual becomes a manager given wM(z, a) such that
V M(z, a) = max
s∈[0,a]
u(a− s) + βEz′
[
V
(
z′, wM(z, a) + (1 + r)s
)∣∣∣ z] . (1.4)
Note that both the next-period wealth for a worker,w+(1+r)s, and that for a manger,wM(z, a)+
(1 + r)s, are realized without uncertainty.
V SA(z, a) is the value if an individual chooses to be a stand-alone entrepreneur who runs
a private company or a publicly held corporation such that
V SA(z, a) =
(
1− PM(z, a)
)
· V SA0 (z, a) + PM(z, a) ·max
{
V SA0 (z, a), V M(z, a)
}
,
V SA0 (z, a) = max
kC ,kD,kE
u
(
a− kC
)
+ βEz′,δ′
[
V (z′, a′)| z, k
(
kC , kD, kE
)] (1.5)
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where the firm’s capital in production k is a function of private finance kC , external debt
finance kD, and external equity finance kE. The entrepreneur’s next-period wealth a′ is a
function of shocks to managerial talent z′ and capital depreciation rate δ′ given
{
kC , kD, kE
}
.
Lastly, V BG(z1, a1) is the value if an individual of (z1, a1) chooses to be a business-
group entrepreneur who controls a business group consisting of two corporations, a parent
with (z1, k1) and a subsidiary with (z2, k2). The business-group entrepreneur determines
both firms’ capital k1 and k2 by choosing
{
kCi , k
D
i , k
E
i
}
i∈{1,2} given
{
z2, w
M(z2, a2)
}
. kC1
is the private finance that the business-group entrepreneur offers to the parent, and kC2 is
the internal equity finance that the parent offers to the subsidiary. I will specify how the
business-group entrepreneur optimizes k1 and k2 in the following section. For now, let’s focus
on that the business-group entrepreneur chooses z2, the optimal managerial talent for the
subsidiary, given wM(z2, a2) and PBG(z2, a2) such that
V BG(z1, a1) = max
z2
[(
1−
∑
a2
PBG(z2, a2)
)
· V SA0 (z1, a1)
+
∑
a2
PBG(z2, a2) ·max
{
V SA0 (z1, a1), V BG0 (z1, a1| z2, a2)
}]
V BG0 (z1, a1| z2, a2) = max{kCi ,kDi ,kEi }i∈{1,2}
u
(
a1 − kC1
)
+ βEz′1,z′2,δ′1,δ′2
[
V
(
z′1, a
′
1
)∣∣ z1, z2, k1, k2] .
(1.6)
The business-group entrepreneur’s next-period wealth a′1 is a function of (z′1, δ′1, z′2, δ′2) given
the firms’ capital structure
{
kCi , k
D
i , k
E
i
}
i∈{1,2}. Note that the probability of matching with a
manager PBG(z2, a2) is endogenously determined in an equilibrium and that its sum can be
less than one such that ∑a2 PBG(z2, a2) ≤ 1. If the demand of z2 is higher than the supply of
z2, some business-group entrepreneurs would fail to be matched with their targeted managers
featuring z2.
Figure 1.2 is an expository diagram of an individual’s occupational choice given his or her
managerial talent z and wealth a.8 First, it shows that the poor and untalented are likely
8Figure 1.2 is not the equilibrium output of the model. It is an example constructed for clarifying the
idea of an individual’s occupational choice problem.
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to become workers because they are not productive enough to run firms and because they
do not have enough wealth to hire managers. Secondly, it shows that the more talented,
the more likely to become entrepreneurs. A declining line separating SA from W captures
financial frictions with which would-be entrepreneurs could become workers if they have not
enough wealth. Lastly, it shows that the rich tend to become business-group entrepreneurs
because they can pay managerial compensation and hire talented individuals as business-
group managers running subsidiary firms.
Figure 1.2: Occupational Choice Given Managerial Talent z and Wealth a
1.3 Financial Frictions and Three Types of Firms
Suppose that an entrepreneur who controls her firm can divert τ fraction of the firm’s
cash flow. The tunneling ratio τ captures the degree of financial frictions in an economy.
Accordingly, (1−τ) captures the degree of investor protection in an economy because (1−τ) is
the residual cash flow investors can enforce on a firm if the firm does not make reimbursement.
Given financial frictions, an entrepreneur can choose her firms’ ownership structure: a
private company, a publicly held corporation, or a pyramidal business group. Specifically, an
12
entrepreneur can run her private company that is only allowed to access external debt markets
with the help of the entrepreneur’s wealth as collateral. I assume that the external debt
finance is bounded above by the firm’s lowest cash flow in order to guarantee its repayment.
For raising more external finance, an entrepreneur can pay flotation costs and incorporate
a publicly held corporation that can tap into external equity markets. I assume that an
entrepreneur owns all shares of her firm at the onset of its incorporation, which can be sold
to outside shareholders to raise external equity finance. The extent of external equity finance
her firm can raise is assumed to be proportional to the firm’s expected cash flow and the
fraction of shares sold to outside shareholders.
Lastly, an entrepreneur can hire a manager with managerial compensation and build
up a business group that consists of two corporations, a parent run by the entrepreneur
and a subsidiary run by the manager. The business-group entrepreneur uses a pyramidal
ownership structure to control both firms and makes the parent offer internal equity finance
to the subsidiary without financial frictions. Similar to stand-alone corporations, both the
parent and the subsidiary can sell their shares to outside shareholders and raise external
equity finance.
1.3.1 A Private Company
Given her managerial talent and wealth, (z, a), an entrepreneur can run a private company
that is a firm fully owned by her. Due to the lack of external equity finance, a private
company relies on external debt finance. The firm’s capital in production k is determined as
follows. First, the entrepreneur of a private company is obliged for the company’s liability
so that her wealth net of consumption a− c becomes the firm’s collateral kC such that
kC = a− c ≥ 0. (1.7)
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Second, given the collateral kC and the opportunity of tunneling τpi, the firm’s capital
in production k is bounded above as follows.9
(1 + r)k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt Repayment
≤ (1 + r)kC︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collateral
+ (1− τ) inf
z′,δ′
pi (z′, δ′|z, k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Secured Cash Flow to Debtholders
(1.8)
Lastly, the entrepreneur of a private company can choose k and decide how much external
debt finance will be raised. I assume that the firm, or the entrepreneur, can invest in a risk-
free asset by taking k < kC . Thus, the entrepreneur can earn the risk-free residual cash flow
from the firm such that
(1 + r)(kC − k) + inf
z′,δ′
[pi (z′, δ′|z, k)]. (1.9)
To summarize, a stand-alone entrepreneur running a private company solves
V SA0 (z, a) = max
kC∈[0,a],k
u
(
a− kC
)
+ βEz′,δ′ [V (z′, a′)|z] (1.10)
subject to
a′ = pi(z′, δ′|z, k) + (1 + r)(kC − k)
k ≤ kC + 1− τ1 + r infz′,δ′[pi (z
′, δ′|z, k)].
(1.11)
1.3.2 A Publicly Held Corporation
An entrepreneur of (z, a) can choose to incorporate her firm into a publicly held corporation
with flotation costs kF > 0. After its incorporation, a publicly held corporation can tap
into external equity markets. The corporation’s capital in production k is determined by the
sum of private finance kC , external debt finance kD, and external equity finance kE net of
9Unlike publicly held corporations or business groups, expropriation does not occur in a private company
that are fully owned by its entrepreneur.
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flotation costs kF such that
k = kC + kD + kE − kF . (1.12)
Each type of capital is determined as follows. First, the entrepreneur can transfer a
fraction of her wealth kC to her corporation. kC is determined by the entrepreneur’s wealth
a net of her consumption c and private risk-free asset s. I assume that the flotation costs kF
should be paid by the entrepreneur with kC before the firm’s incorporation such that10
kC = a− c− s ≥ kF . (1.13)
In contrast to a private company, the entrepreneur’s wealth cannot be used as collateral
for her corporation because a publicly held corporation is a legal entity that is separated
from its entrepreneur. By construction, however, the wealth transfer from its entrepreneur
to the publicly held corporation works as collateral, and this is why I abuse the notation of
kC .
Second, a publicly held corporation can use external debt finance kD. Given the assump-
tion that an entrepreneur controlling her firm can divert τ fraction of the firm’s cash flow pi,
the external debt finance kD is constrained in order to guarantee its repayment as follows.
Note that a publicly held corporation can make an investment in a risk-free asset by taking
kD < 0.
(1 + r)kD ≤ (1− τ) inf
z′,δ′
[pi (z′, δ′|z, k)] (1.14)
Third, a publicly held corporation can tap into external equity markets. The corporation
can raise external equity kE = kE(σ) by selling its σ ∈ [0, σ¯SA] fraction of shares. Suppose
10kF captures expenses such as underwriting fees, legal fees, or registration fees of issuing shares. Although
in the real world flotation costs consist of fixed costs as wells costs proportional to the extent of shares issued,
only the fixed costs are employed in the model with kF . I exclude the proportional costs that can be paid with
external financing after issuing shares because the efficiency of these back loaded costs is hardly distinguished
from the degree of financial frictions τ . Moreover, in the model kF is paid every periods if an entrepreneur
runs a publicly held corporation successively.
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that (1− σ¯SA) > 0 fraction of the firm’s shares is required for an entrepreneur to take control
of his or her stand-alone corporation. I assume that external capital markets are competitive
and well diversified so that the publicly held corporation can raise external equity with the
risk-free interest rate r.
(1 + r)kE︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Payoff
to Outside Shareholders
= σ· E
z′,δ′
 (1− τ)pi (z′, δ′|z, k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cash Flow after Tunelling
− (1 + r)kD︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt Reimbursement
 , σ ∈ [0, σ¯SA], σ¯SA < 1
(1.15)
As can be seen in the above equation, the firm’s cash flow pi is sequentially distributed to
the entrepreneur with tunneling τpi, to creditors with debt reimbursement (1 + r)kD, and to
shareholders with residual claims.
To summarize, a stand-alone entrepreneur running a publicly held corporation solves
V SA0 (z, a) = max
s≥0, kC ,kD,σ∈[0,σ¯SA]
u
(
a− s− kC
)
+ βEz′,δ′ [V (z′, a′)|z] (1.16)
subject to
a′ = (1 + r)s+ τpi(z′, δ′|z, k) + (1− σ)
{
(1− τ)pi(z′, δ′|z, k)− (1 + r)kD
}
k = kC + kD + kE − kF
kC ∈
[
kF , a− s
]
kD ≤ 1− τ1 + r infz′,δ′[pi (z
′, δ′|z, k)]
kE = σ1 + r Ez′,δ′
[
(1− τ)pi (z′, δ′|z, k)− (1 + r)kD
]
.
(1.17)
Condition 1. The value function V (z, a) satisfies the following condition.
Ez′,δ′ [Va(z′, a′) · {Ez′,δ′pi(z′, δ′|z, k)− pi(z′, δ′|z, k)}| z, k] > 0 (1.18)
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Condition 1 describes that the entrepreneur running a firm is risk-averse. Although the
utility function of an individual is concave by construction, Condition 1 is not guaranteed
in general because of the non-convexity of the individual’s choice set. The individual’s value
function V (z, a) might be locally convex. We need an additional structure to hold Condition
1. From now on, let’s assume that for all (z, k), a minimum cash flow infz′,δ′ pi(z′, δ′|z, k) is
low enough to satisfy Condition 1. Note that the marginal utility of consumption goes to
infinity as consumption goes to zero by construction. Thus, a low enough minimum cash
flow can make the marginal value of wealth Va(z′, a′) large enough to hold Condition 1.
Proposition 1. Given the risk-free investment opportunity for a corporation, kD < 0, a
stand-alone entrepreneur weakly prefers not to hold private asset such that
s = 0.
Given Condition 1 and the risk-free investment opportunity, a stand-alone entrepreneur of
a publicly held corporation strictly prefers a full external equity finance such that
σ = σ¯SA.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Corollary 1. From Proposition 1, the stand-alone entrepreneur’s choice variables degenerate
into
{
kC , kD, σ
}
. Thus, we can simplify the problem of a private company and that of a
publicly held corporation into the common problem of a stand-alone entrepreneur such that
V SA0 (z, a) = max
kC ,kD,σ∈{0,σ¯SA}
u
(
a− kC
)
+ βEz′,δ′ [V (z′, a′)|z] (1.19)
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subject to
a′ = τpi(z′, δ′|z, k) + (1− σ)
{
(1− τ)pi(z′, δ′|z, k)− (1 + r)kD
}
k = kC + kD + kE − kF · 1σ=σ¯SA
kC ∈
[
kF · 1σ=σ¯SA , a
]
kD ≤ 1− τ1 + r infz′,δ′[pi (z
′, δ′|z, k)]
kE = σ¯SA · 1σ=σ¯SA1 + r Ez′,δ′
[
(1− τ)pi (z′, δ′|z, k)− (1 + r)kD
]
.
(1.20)
1.3.3 A Business Group
A business group is defined as a collection of two publicly held corporations, Firm 1 and
Firm 2, which are controlled by a business-group entrepreneur. Let z1 be the productivity
of Firm 1 that inherits from the business-group entrepreneur and let z2 be the productivity
of Firm 2 that inherits from the manager.
Assume that a business group is connected through a pyramidal ownership structure such
that Firm 2 is owned and controlled by Firm 1 that is owned and controlled by a business-
group entrepreneur. More specifically, the business-group entrepreneur incorporates Firm
1 with private finance kC1 , keeps at least (1 − σ¯BG) shares of Firm 1, and controls Firm 1.
Similarly, Firm 1 incorporates Firm 2 with internal equity finance kC2 , keeps at least (1−σ¯BG)
shares of Firm 2, and controls Firm 2. I assume that the manager of Firm 2 takes managerial
compensation wM(z2, a2), relinquishes her control rights and cash flow rights over Firm 2,
and hands them over to Firm 1. As a result, the entrepreneur of a business group can control
both firms and divert cash flow from both firms.
Two things are worth noting. First, the pair of managerial talent z2 and its corre-
sponding managerial compensation wM(z2, a2) can be understood as a contract between an
entrepreneur who buys z2 and a manager who sells z2 with the price of wM(z2, a2). Thus,
how to pin down wM(z2, a2) can be critical in the model. Given the lack of managerial talent
markets, I assume that wM(z2, a2) is a certainty equivalent for an individual, who can run a
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stand-alone firm or become a worker as outside options. It will be formally specified in the
following section.
Second, I assume that (1 − σ¯BG) fraction of shares is required to acquire control rights
over a business group. σ¯BG can be different from that of a stand-alone firm, σ¯SA, because
(1 − σ¯BG) needs to capture large enough block shares in order to ensure exclusive control
rights over business-group firms, while (1 − σ¯SA) only captures stand-alone entrepreneur’s
payoff structure proportional to the firm’s cash flow. Thus, I assume that σ¯BG ≤ σ¯SA
although the model lacks the micro foundation about how to pin down σ¯SA and σ¯BG.
Capital Structure of Firm 2
For now, suppose that Firm 2 is run by a manager who has z2 and a2. I assume that the
flotation costs kF and the managerial compensation wM = wM(z2, a2) should be paid by
Firm 1 through internal equity finance kC2 such that
kC2 ≥ kF + wM . (1.21)
This implies that Firm 2 should be incorporated before tapping into external capital markets.
Firm 2 raises external debt finance kD2 under the following constraint given the assumption
that the business-group entrepreneur, who controls Firm 1 that controls Firm 2, can expro-
priate cash flow from Firm 2.
kD2 ≤
1− τ
1 + r infz′2,δ′2
pi (z′2, δ′2|z2, k2) (1.22)
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Firm 2 raises external equity finance kE2 by selling its σ2 fraction of shares.
(1 + r)kE2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Payoff
to Outside Shareholders
= σ2 · E
z′2,δ
′
2
(1− τ)pi (z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cash Flow after Tunelling
− (1 + r)kD2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt Reimbursement
 , σ2 ≤ σ¯BG
(1.23)
From the above equations, the capital in production of Firm 2, k2, is determined by the sum
of internal equity finance kC2 , external debt finance kD2 , and external equity finance kE2 net
of flotation costs kF and managerial compensation wM such that
k2 = kC2 + kD2 + kE2 − kF − wM . (1.24)
Capital Structure of Firm 1
A business-group entrepreneur of (z1, a1) can transfer her wealth kC1 to Firm 1. I assume
that both firms’ flotation costs and Firm 2’s managerial compensation should be paid by the
entrepreneur with kC1 such that
kC1 = a1 − c− s ≥ kF︸︷︷︸
Flotation Costs
of Firm 1
+ kF + wM︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gross Flotation Costs
of Firm 2
. (1.25)
This is not only because the timing of incorporating both Firm 1 and Firm 2 is simultaneous
in the model but also because the contract between the entrepreneur and the manager should
be set up before incorporating Firm 2.
Given the capital structure of Firm 2,
{
kC2 , k
D
2 , k
E
2
}
, and its cash flow, pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2),
Firm 1 raises external debt finance kD1 under the following constraint.
(1 + r)kD1 ≤ (1− τ) pi1 ∀ (z′1, z′2, δ′1, δ′2)
20
where pi1 is the gross cash flow from Firm 1 defined by
pi1 = pi
(
z′1, δ
′
1|z1, k∗1 = k1 − kC2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gross Output Net of Labor Costs and
Capital Depreciation from Firm 1
+ (1− σ2)
{
(1− τ) pi2 − (1 + r) kD2
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Residual Claims of Firm 1 from Firm 2
,
pi2 = pi (z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gross Output Net of Labor Costs and
Capital Depreciation from Firm 2
.
We can rewrite the above inequality such that
kD1 ≤
1− τ
1 + r
[
inf
z′1,δ
′
1
[pi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1)] + (1− σ2)
{
(1− τ) inf
z′2,δ
′
2
[pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)]− (1 + r)kD2
}]
.
(1.26)
Conceptually, the internal equity finance kC2 used by Firm 2 should be raised from Firm 1’s
retained earnings (e.g. Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006b)). Given the limitation that firms
are created and liquidated every period, however, I use Firm 1’s capital k1 as the proxy for
the Firm 1’s retained earnings. Thus, the internal equity finance kC2 is raised out of k1, and
Firm 1’s capital in production becomes k∗1 = k1 − kC2 > 0.
Lastly, Firm 1 raises external equity finance kE1 by selling its σ1 fraction of shares to
outside shareholders such that
(1 + r)kE1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Payoff
to Outside Shareholders
= σ1 · E
z′1,z
′
2,δ
′
1,δ
′
2
[
(1− τ)pi1 − (1 + r)kD1
]
, σ1 ≤ σ¯BG.
It can be rewritten as follows.
kE1 =
σ1
1 + r
[
(1−τ) E
z′1,δ
′
1
[
pi(z′1, δ′1|z′1, k∗1)
]
+(1−τ)(1−σ2)
{
(1−τ) E
z′2,δ
′
2
[
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)
]−(1+r)kD2 }−(1+r)kD1 ]
(1.27)
From the above equations, the capital in production of Firm 1, k∗1, is determined by the
sum of private finance kC1 , external debt finance kD1 , and external equity finance kE1 net of
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flotation costs kF and internal equity finance kC2 such that
k∗1 = k1 − kC2
= kC1 + kD1 + kE1 − kF − kC2 .
(1.28)
A Business-Group Entrepreneur’s Problem
Given (z2, a2) and wM = wM(z2, a2), a business-group entrepreneur of (z1, a1) solves
V BG0
(
z1, a1| z2, wM
)
= max
s≥0
{kCi ,kDi ,kEi }i∈{1,2}
u
(
a1 − s− kC1
)
+βEz′1,z′2,δ′1,δ′2 [V (z
′
1, a
′
1)|z1, z2] (1.29)
subject to
a′1 = (1 + r)s+ τpi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1) + τpi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)
+ (1− σ1)
{
(1− τ)pi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1)− (1 + r)kD1
}
+ (1− σ1 + σ1τ)(1− σ2)
{
(1− τ)pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)− (1 + r)kD2
}
Equation (21) - (28)
(1.30)
Condition 2. The value function V (z1, a1) satisfies the following conditions:
E(z′i,δ′i)i∈{1,2}
[
Va(z′1, a′1) ·
{
Ez′1,δ
′
1
pi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1)− pi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1)
}∣∣∣ z1, z2, k∗1, k2] > 0,
E(z′i,δ′i)i∈{1,2}
[
Va(z′1, a′1) ·
{
Ez′2,δ
′
2
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)− pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2
}∣∣∣ z1, z2, k∗1, k2] > 0. (1.31)
Proposition 2. Given the non-negative financial frictions, τ > 0, and the risk-free invest-
ment opportunity of Firm 2 such that kD2 < 0, a business-group entrepreneur weakly prefers
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no private risk-free asset and a full external debt finance of Firm 1 such that
s = 0,
kD1 =
1− τ
1 + r
[
inf
z′1,δ
′
1
[
pi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1)
]
+ (1− σ2)
{
(1− τ) inf
z′2,δ
′
2
[
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)
]− (1 + r)kD2
}]
.
Given Condition 2 and the risk-free investment opportunity of Firm 2, a business-group
entrepreneur strictly prefers a full external equity finance of both firms such that
σ1 = σ2 = σ¯BG.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Corollary 2. From Proposition 2, the business-group entrepreneur’s choice variables degen-
erate into
{
kC1 , k
C
2 , k
D
2
}
. Thus, we can rewrite the business-group entrepreneur’s problem as
follows.
V BG0
(
z1, a1| z2, wM
)
= max
kC1 ,k
C
2 ,k
D
2
u
(
a1 − kC1
)
+ βEz′1,z′2,δ′1,δ′2
[
V (z′1, a′1)|z1, z2
]
(1.32)
subject to
kC1 ∈
[
2kF + wM , a
]
, kC2 ∈
[
kF + wM , k1
]
, kD2 ≤
1− τ
1 + r infz′2,δ′2
[
pi2
(
z′2, δ
′
2|z2, k2
)]
k∗1 = kC1 − kF − kC2
+ 1− τ1 + r
{
σ¯BGEz′1,δ′1
[
pi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1)
]
+ (1− σ¯BG) inf
z′1,δ
′
1
[
pi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1)
]− (1− σ¯BG)(1 + r)kD2
}
+ (1− τ)
2(1− σ¯BG)
1 + r
{
σ¯BGEz′2,δ′2
[
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)
]
+ (1− σ¯BG) inf
z′2,δ
′
2
[
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)
]}
k2 = kC2 − kF − wM + (1− σ¯BG)kD2 +
1− τ
1 + r σ¯BGEz
′
2,δ
′
2
[
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)
]
(1.33)
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a′1 = τpi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1) + τpi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)
+ (1− σ¯BG)(1− τ)
{
pi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1)− inf
z′1,δ
′
1
[
pi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1)
]}
− (1− σ¯BG)(1− τ)(1− σ¯BG)
{
(1− τ) inf
z′2,δ
′
2
[
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)
]− (1 + r)kD2
}
+ (1− σ¯BG + σ¯BGτ)(1− σ¯BG)
{
(1− τ)pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)− (1 + r)kD2
}
.
Note that in Corollary 2, Firm 1’s capital in production k∗1 decreases with kC2 but in-
creases with the cash flow of Firm 2, pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2) in the right hand side of k∗1. Given that
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2) increases with k2 and that k2 increases with kC2 , we can see that the financial
advantage of a business group derives not only from no limited commitment problem such
that kC2 < k1, but also from an increase in the cash flow from Firm 2 to Firm 1.
1.4 A Matching Rule and a Stationary Equilibrium
1.4.1 A Matching Rule Between Business-Group Entrepreneurs
and the Others
To complete the model, let’s consider an ad-hoc matching rule. It is designed for mitigating
the gap between the model and the real world. Although the model assumes one-period
matching between a business-group entrepreneur and a manager by construction, in the real
world the matching between a business-group entrepreneur of (z, a) and a subsidiary Firm
2 of z2 is stable over time.
First, let’s assume that the managerial compensation wM(z2, a2) is equal to the certainty
equivalent for a manager who has outside options such that
V M(z2, a2|wM(z2, a2)) = max
{
V W0 (z2, a2), V SA0 (z2, a2)
}
. (1.34)
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This assumption implies that a business-group entrepreneur acquires all of gains from build-
ing a business group and that the manager of Firm 2 will have less wealth in the next period
than the expected wealth a stand-alone entrepreneur would have because of the risk-averse
preference.
Second, suppose that the business-group entrepreneur can choose z2 but cannot choose a2.
A business-group entrepreneur and its manager of Firm 2 who has a2 are randomly matched
given z2. As a result, while an individual always accepts the offer of being a manger given the
managerial compensation as a certainty equivalent, a business-group entrepreneur of (z, a)
can turn down the opportunity of launching a subsidiary Firm 2 if the matched manager
has too high a2 that induces wM(z2, a2) > w¯M(z, a|z2), where w¯M(z, a|z2) is the largest
managerial compensation a business-group entrepreneur of (z, a) can be better off such that
w¯M(z, a|z2) = sup
{
wM > 0 : V BG0 (z, a|z2, wM) ≥ V SA0 (z, a|σ ≤ σ¯BG)
}
. (1.35)
Lastly, assume that a business-group entrepreneur, who screens out wM(z2, a2) > w¯M(z, a|z2)
and gives up the opportunity of launching a subsidiary Firm 2, should keep at least (1− σ¯BG)
shares of Firm 1. This assumption begets a business group without Firm 2, which sells only
σ¯BG fraction of shares, not σ¯SA. Although the capital structures of a business group without
Firm 2 is ex-post suboptimal, it is ex-ante optimal for a business-group entrepreneur who
wants to launch Firm 2 with the possibility of being matched with wM(z2, a2) ≤ w¯M(z, a|z2).
The possibility of no subsidiary Firm 2 can be understood as an opportunity cost for a
business-group entrepreneur. Given the limitation of the model defining a business group as
a collection of two corporations, a business group without Firm 2 can be understood as a
business group with less pyramidal layer.
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1.4.2 A Stationary Equilibrium
Given the matching rule, a stationary equilibrium consists of a stationary joint distribu-
tion of managerial talent and wealth F (z, a); the probability of being hired as a man-
ager PM(z, a) and the probability of being matched with a manager PBG(z2, a2); prices{
r, w, wM(z2, a2)
}
; and individual policy functions such as (i) occupation o(z, a) for an in-
dividual, (ii) private risk-free asset s(z, a) for a worker or a manager, (iii) private finance
kC(z, a), external debt finance kD(z, a), and external equity finance kE(z, a) for a stand-alone
entrepreneur, (iv) the optimal managerial talent for a subsidiary firm z2(z, a), private finance
kC1 (z, a|z2, a2), internal equity finance kC2 (z, a|z2, a2), and external debt finance kD2 (z, a|z2, a2)
for a business-group entrepreneur matched with wM(z2, a2) ≤ w¯M(z, a|z2), and (v) private fi-
nance kC(z, a) and external debt finance kD(z, a) for a business-group entrepreneur matched
with wM(z2, a2) > w¯M(z, a|z2) such that
1. Given the stationary joint distribution of managerial talent and wealth F (z, a), the
probability of being hired as a manager PM(z, a), the probability of being matched with
a manager PBG(z2, a2), and prices
{
r, w, wM(z2, a2)
}
, the individual policy functions
solve the individual’s problem in Section 2.2;
2. The joint distribution of managerial talent and wealth F (z, a) is stationary such that
F (z, a) =
∫
{ (z˜,a˜)| z′(z˜)≤z, a′(z′,δ′|z˜,a˜)≤a}
dF (z˜, a˜); (1.36)
3. The probability of a worker or a stand-alone entrepreneur being hired as a manager,
PM(z2, a2), and the probability of a business-group entrepreneur being matched with
a manager, PBG(z2, a2), satisfy the following condition for all z2
∫
o(z2,a2)∈{W,SA}
PM (z2, a2)·F (z2, da2) =
∫
o(z,a)=BG
z2(z,a)=z2
∫
o(z2,a2)∈{W,SA}
wM (z2,a2)≤w¯M (z,a|z2)
PBG(z2, a2)da2dF (z, a)
(1.37)
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4. Capital and labor markets clear such that
(capital market)
∫
{a− c(z, a)} dF (z, a)
=
∫
o(z,a)=SA
{
k(z, a) + 1σ(z,a)>0 · kF
}
·
{
1− PM (z, a)
}
dF (z, a)
+
∫
o(z,a)=BG
∫
o(z2,a2)={W,SA}
wM (z2,a2)≤w¯M (z,a|z2)
{
2kF + wM (z2, a2) + k∗1(z, a|z2, a2) + k2(z, a|z2, a2)
}
· PBG(z2(z, a), a2) da2dF (z, a)
+
∫
o(z,a)=BG
∫
o(z2,a2)={W,SA}
wM (z2,a2)>w¯M (z,a|z2)
{
kF + k1(z, a|kC2 = 0)
}
· PBG(z2(z, a), a2) da2dF (z, a)
+
∫
o(z,a)=BG
∫
o(z2,a2)={W,SA}
{
kF + k1(z, a|kC2 = 0)
}
·
{
1− PBG(z2(z, a), a2)
}
da2dF (z, a);
(1.38)
(labor market)
∫
o(z,a)=W
{
1− PM (z, a)
}
dF (z, a)
=
∫
o(z,a)=SA
∫
z′
`(z′, k(z, a)) dG(z′|z) ·
{
1− PM (z, a)
}
dF (z, a)
+
∫
o(z,a)=BG
∫
o(z2,a2)={W,SA}
wM (z2,a2)≤w¯M (z,a|z2)
{∫
z′
`(z′, k∗1(z, a|z2, a2)) dG(z′|z) +
∫
z′2
`(z′2, k2(z, a|z2, a2)) dG(z′2|z2)
}
· PBG(z2(z, a), a2) da2dF (z, a)
+
∫
o(z,a)=BG
∫
o(z2,a2)={W,SA}
wM (z2,a2)>w¯M (z,a|z2)
∫
z′
`(z′, k1(z, a|kC2 = 0)) dG(z′|z) · PBG(z2(z, a), a2) da2dF (z, a)
+
∫
o(z,a)=BG
∫
o(z2,a2)={W,SA}
∫
z′
`(z′, k1(z, a|kC2 = 0)) dG(z′|z) ·
{
1− PBG(z2(z, a), a2)
}
da2dF (z, a)
(1.39)
where G(z′|z) is a conditional cdf derived from the transition probability of managerial
talents.
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1.5 Remarks on the Model
1.5.1 Financial Advantage of Business Groups
In order to gauge how well internal capital markets can alleviate exogenous financial frictions
in the model, let’s consider how much private wealth of an entrepreneur is required to raise
a fixed amount of capital in production given the ownership structure of firms.
Suppose that a business group consists of two firms that replicate a stand-alone firm’s
capital structure with identical managerial talents such that
k = k∗1 = k2, z = z1 = z2, σ = σ¯SA = σ¯BG.
Let’s compare the required level of private finance for a stand-alone firm kC to that for a
business group kC1 in order to raise k = k∗1 = k2. For a stand-alone firm, the feasible capital
in production k is determined by the following equation.
k = kC − kF + 1− τ1 + r {σ¯Epi(z
′, δ′|z, k) + (1− σ¯) inf pi(z′, δ′|z, k)} (1.40)
Similarly, the set of feasible capital in production for a business group, i.e. k∗1 for Firm 1 and
k2 for Firm 2, is determined by the following equations.
k∗1 = kC1 − kF − kC2 +
1− τ
1 + r {σ¯Epi(z
′
1, δ
′
1|z, k∗1) + (1− σ¯) inf pi(z′1, δ′1|z, k∗1)}
+ (1− τ)
2(1− σ¯)σ¯
1 + r {Epi (z
′
2, δ
′
2|z, k2)− inf pi (z′2, δ′2|z, k2)} ,
k2 = kC2 − kF − wM +
1− τ
1 + r {σ¯Epi(z
′
2, δ
′
2|z, k2) + (1− σ¯) inf pi(z′2, δ′2|z, k2)}
(1.41)
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By solving for the above equations with k∗1 = k2 = k,
kC1 = 2kC + wM −
(1− τ)2(1− σ¯)σ¯
1 + r {Epi (z
′
2, δ
′
2|z, k)− inf pi (z′2, δ′2|z, k)}
= 2kC + wM − (1− τ)(1− σ¯)kE
(1.42)
where kE is the feasible external equity finance that a stand-alone firm with managerial
talent z can raise given kC .
Now, we can compare the effective degree of financial frictions between business-group
firms and stand-alone firms. By fixing capital in production k = k∗1 = k2, let’s observe the
ratio of capital in production to private finance for a stand-alone entrepreneur (SA) and for
a business-group entrepreneur (BG) such that
λSA =
k
kC
, λBG =
k∗1 + k2
kC1
. (1.43)
Then, the financial advantage of a business group can be measured by the following ratio.
λBG
λSA
∣∣∣∣∣
k=k∗1=k2
= 1
1 + 12
{
wM
kC
− (1− τ)(1− σ¯)kE
kC
} (1.44)
The ratio depends both on the cost of building up a subsidiary firm, wM , and the efficiency
of external capital markets, (1 − τ)(1 − σ¯)kE. If the latter outweighs the former, the ratio
becomes greater than 1. This implies that a business group raises more external finance than
a stand-alone firm does given the same amount of private finance. For instance, suppose that
wM
kC
= 0.4 and kE
kC
= 20 given τ = 0.3 and σ¯ = 0.9. Then, the ratio becomes 2 and it means
that a business group raises twice larger capital than a stand-alone firm does given the same
amount of private finance.
The asymmetric financial advantage of business groups can be lessened if business groups
are subject to a lower fraction of equity shares sold to outside shareholders such that σ¯BG <
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σ¯SA. With this conditions, the above ratio can be rewritten as follows.
1
1 + 12
[
wM
kC
+
{
2
(
1− σ¯BG
σ¯SA
)
− (1− τ)(1− σ¯BG) σ¯BGσ¯SA
}
kE
kC
] (1.45)
Given the same specification with the above but σ¯BG = 0.87 and σ¯SA = 0.9, we can observe
that the ratio becomes 1.01 and the asymmetric financial advantage of business groups
is almost nullified. It teaches us that the minimum equity shares (1 − σ¯BG), which the
controlling shareholder of a business group should keep to control over the business group,
can have sizable effects on mitigating the asymmetric financial advantage of business groups.
However, note that this example is made up for a stark comparison and business-group
entrepreneurs can choose z2 and optimize their external financing. Thus, we can guess that
σ¯BG should be much lower in order to lessen the asymmetric financial advantage of business
groups in an equilibrium.
1.5.2 Asymmetric Financial Frictions
Given the finite amount of capital stock in an economy, the asymmetric financial advantage of
business groups is in other words the asymmetric financial frictions between business-group
firms and stand-alone firms, which can result in factor misallocation in a general equilibrium.
Note that managerial compensation wM is a certainty equivalent proportional to the firm’s
expected cash flow net of risk premium while external equity finance kE is proportional to
the firm’s expected cash flow. This implies that as τ decreases, kE can grow faster than
wM and that (1 − τ)(1 − σ¯)kE can grow much faster than wM . Thus, improvement of
investor protection captured by declining τ can increase the gap of external finance raised
by business-group firms and stand-alone firms.
The asymmetric financial frictions are of concern because they can be another source of
factor misallocation. In an equilibrium, alleviated financial frictions for business groups can
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increase the demand of external capital and push up the price of capital. For stand-alone
firms, however, the higher price of capital r acts like the higher degree of financial frictions
τ in that financial constraints of external finance always come with 11+r as well as (1 − τ).
Thus, given the lack of internal capital markets with the higher price of capital, stand-alone
firms cannot raise as much capital as they could do in an economy without business groups.
As a result, an economy with business groups can give rise to the higher price of capital and
lower aggregate output due to factor misallocation. Moreover, since the asymmetric financial
frictions between business-group firms and stand-alone firms are intensified as the degree of
financial frictions are mitigated, we can guess that costs of business groups are more likely
to dominate their benefits in an equilibrium as financial frictions decrease. Last but not the
least, the financial advantage of business groups increasing with investor protection (1− τ)
implies that the prevalence of business groups needs not attenuate as investor protection
improves.
1.5.3 External Finance Substituting for Private Finance
As the degree of financial frictions τ decreases, the model shows that both the volume of
external equity finance kE and corporate savings, or corporate lending −kD, can expand
without increasing capital in production k. Suppose that firms are financially unconstrained
and that the degree of financial frictions is lessened such that
dτ < 0, dk = dk∗1 = dk2 = 0. (1.46)
From Corollary 2, we can see that a business-group entrepreneur can be better off by in-
creasing consumption dc > 0 and decreasing both private finance dkC1 < 0 and external debt
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finance dkD2 < 0 without altering the next-period wealth da′ = 0 such that
dc = −dkC1 ,
da′|dk∗1=dk2=0 = (+)dτ − τ(1− σ¯BG)(1 + r)dk
D
2 = 0,
dk∗1 + dk2 = (−)dτ + dkC1 + τ(1− σ¯BG)dkD2 = 0.
(1.47)
Note that a decrease in private finance dkC1 < 0 without changing capital in production
dk∗1 = dk2 = 0 means larger net external finance such that
d(kD1 + kE1 ) > 0, d(kD2 + kE2 ) > 0. (1.48)
Moreover, from Corollary 2 with dk2 = 0, we can observe that internal equity finance kC2
increases with corporate savings −kD2 such that
dkC2 = −(1− σ¯BG)dkD2 > 0. (1.49)
Similarly, from Corollary 1, a stand-alone entrepreneur can be better off by increasing
consumption dc > 0 and decreasing both private finance dkC < 0 and external debt finance
dkD < 0 without altering the next-period wealth da′ = 0 such that
dc = −dkC ,
da′|dk=0 = (+)dτ − (1− σ)(1 + r)dkD = 0,
dk = (−)dτ + dkC + (1− σ¯SA)dkD = 0,
(1.50)
A decrease in private finance dkC < 0 without changing capital in production dk = 0 means
larger net external finance such that
d(kD + kE) > 0. (1.51)
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The above results show that the excessive amount of external equity finance can be
reinvested through corporate savings for risk sharing. In case of business groups, a parent
firm’s excessive external finance flows into its internal equity finance that is used by the
subsidiary firm’s investment for risk sharing. Moreover, by raising more external finance, an
entrepreneur can reduce wealth transferred to her firm, consume more, and save less. The
declining savings ratio of the rich, most of whom are business-group entrepreneurs financially
unconstrained, can result in declining capital stock of an economy. Thus, in the model, a
strictly positive correlation between the price of capital and aggregate capital in production
of an economy can be broken as financial frictions decrease.
1.6 A Numerical Example of the Model
1.6.1 Setup
I construct a numerical example of the model and use it to compare two economies: an
economy with business groups in which an entrepreneur can choose to create a business
group and an economy without business groups in which building a business group is not an
option for an entrepreneur.
Table 1.1 summarizes parameters used in the numerical example. A CRRA utility func-
tion is employed such that u(c) = c1−γ−11−γ . I choose parameters that are conventional in the
literature with one exception, a time discounting factor β, which is intentionally chosen very
low for the fast convergence of numerical calculation. Model specific parameters such as
flotation costs and maximum equity shares sold to outside shareholders are based on the
rule of thumb.11
11For example, I choose σ¯BG = 0.7 because it is one of the criteria Fair Trade Commission in South Korea
uses to identify if a corporation is a business-group subsidiary.
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Description Parameter
Time discounting factor β = 0.85
Relative risk aversion γ = 1.2
Span of control α + θ = 0.8
Capital share α = 0.8/3
Labor share θ = 0.8∗2/3
Average capital depreciation rate Eδ′ = 0.059
Flotation costs kF = 20
Stand-alone firm’s equity share sold out σ¯SA = 0.9
Business-group firm’s equity share sold out σ¯BG = 0.7
Table 1.1: Parameters
The wealth space is discretized into 20 exponentially increasing grids from a(1) = 1.0×
10−4 to a(20) = 1.0 × 106. The managerial talent space is discretized into 20 exponentially
increasing girds from z(1) = 1 to z(20) = 4. The transition probability of the managerial
talent from z = z(i) to z′ = z(j) is defined such that 12
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 19, 20} , j = max {1,min {20, i+ k}} with probability pk, k ∈ {−9,−8, ..., 8, 9},
p−9 p−8 p−7 p−6 p−5 p−4 p−3 p−2 p−1 p0 p+1 p+2 p+3 p+4 p+5 p+6 p+7 p+8 p+9
0.005 0.005 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
.
Table 1.2: The Transition Probability of Managerial Talent
Lastly, I assume that the capital depreciation rate δ′ is a simple random variable, which
12Note that given the exponentially increasing managerial talent space, the transition probability defined
in Table 2 mimics a scale-free growth process bounded below z′ = z(1) with negative drift, which can
approximate a stationary Pareto distribution (e.g. Gabaix (1999)).
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is independent of the shocks to managerial talent such that
δ′ =

δ¯ = 0.8 with probability 0.05
δ = 0.02 with probability 0.95
. (1.52)
1.6.2 Observations
Observation 1 (Occupational Choice). The rich choose to become business-group entrepreneurs.
The poor but talented are hired as business-group managers with positive probabilities. The
northwest region of (z, a), where individuals with the positive probabilities of being hired as
managers reside, becomes smaller as investor protection improves. The poor, untalented
become workers.
Figure 1.3 shows occupational choices of individuals given a moderate degree of financial
frictions, τ = 0.5. We can see that the east where the rich reside is filled with business-
group entrepreneurs and that the northwest where the poor but talented reside is filled with
stand-alone entrepreneurs who can be hired as business-group managers. This occupational
policy function shows that pyramidal business groups work as start-up breeders that can
foster productive firms given capital market imperfections. In the southwest, a declining line
separating a SA region from a W region captures that wealth is required for an individual
to become a stand-alone entrepreneurs given financial frictions.
As the fraction of diversion decreases to τ = 0.1, two changes are observed in the fol-
lowing Figure 1.4, which depicts occupational choices of individuals in an economy with
business groups given τ = 0.1. First, the rich but untalented still become business-group
entrepreneurs because they expect to earn ex-ante positive profits by hiring the talented as
managers. We will see that these unproductive business-group entrepreneurs can be a source
of resource misallocation. If we shut down the possibility of creating pyramidal business
groups, the southeast region in Figure 1.6 shows that the rich but untalented business-group
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entrepreneurs would become workers in an economy without business groups given τ = 0.1.
Figure 1.3: Occupational Map in an Economy With Business Groups Given τ = 0.5. No
population exists outside the border of orange line.
Figure 1.4: Occupational Map in an Economy With Business Groups Given τ = 0.1. No
population exists outside the border of orange line.
36
Second, Figure 1.4 shows that fewer individuals are hired as business-group managers.
Note that the managerial compensation wM(z2, a2) is likely to be increasing as financial
frictions decrease because an outside option of running a stand-alone firm should be a bet-
ter option with lower financial frictions. Thus, business-group entrepreneurs have to hire
the more talented but still financially constrained in order to earn positive profits. The
contracted upper northwest region in Figure 1.4 captures this rising cut-off value of manage-
rial talents, which can give business-group entrepreneurs positive profits with high enough
managerial talent but small enough managerial compensation.
Figure 1.5: Occupational Map in an Economy
Without Business Groups Given τ = 0.5
Figure 1.6: Occupational Map in an Economy
Without Business Groups Given τ = 0.1
Observation 2 (The Relative Number of Business-Group Firms). The prevalence of business
groups shows insignificant correlation with the strength of investor protection measured by
(1− τ). Specifically, the relative number of business-group firms out of all corporations does
not decrease with (1− τ).
Observation 2 can be understood as a corollary of Observation 1, which states that
the rich become business-group entrepreneurs regardless of the degree of financial frictions.
The following Figure 1.7 shows us two interesting features about the prevalence of business
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groups. First, business-group firms cannot thrive under too severe financial frictions such as
τ ≥ 0.7. This is because too severe financial frictions undermine the financial advantage of
a pyramidal ownership structure that leverages on external capital markets.
Second, although the total number of business-group firms is unvarying, the number of
subsidiary firms decreases as financial frictions decrease. Observation 1 already shows that
the number of individuals who have the positive probability of being hired as managers
decreases as financial frictions decrease. We will see in the following observations that
subsidiaries are more productive than parents and that this decreasing ratio of subsidiary
firms can weaken the benefits of pyramidal business groups as start-up breeders.
Figure 1.7: The Prevalence of Business Groups Measured by the Relative Number of Firms
Observation 3 (Asymmetric Financial Frictions Between Business-Group and Stand-Alone
Firms). Business-group firms have a larger ratio of capital to labor than stand-alone firms.
The variance of capital to labor ratios is smaller within business-group firms than within
stand-alone firms.
Given the Cobb-Douglas production function, the ratio of capital to labor would be
identical to all types of firms if an economy had no financial frictions and no shocks to
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managerial talents. Thus, business-group firms’ higher mean and smaller variance of capital-
to-labor ratios suggest that business-group firms have better financial conditions than stand-
alone firms. Figure 1.8 shows that these asymmetric financial frictions persist and hardly
vary even though investor protection improves.
Figure 1.8 also shows that public corporations achieve almost identical capital-to-labor
ratios to business groups as τ goes to zero. This implies that firms would be financially un-
constrained if they could use external equity finance with fine investor protection. However,
the asymmetric financial frictions between business-group and stand-alone firms do not wane
because most stand-alone entrepreneur don’t pay flotation costs kF and turn down the option
of tapping into external equity markets. As can be seen in Figure 1.7, most corporations are
business-group firms, and the relative number of public corporations using external equity
finance decreases as τ decreases.
(a) (b)
Figure 1.8: Distributions of Capital-to-Labor Ratio
Then, the question is if these asymmetric financial frictions have sizable effects on resource
allocation. The following Observation 4 gives an answer to the question.
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Observation 4 (Firm Size Distributions). Business-group firms have the larger mean and
variance of employment and also have the larger mean and variance of TFP than stand-alone
firms.
The following Figure 1.9 shows that business-group firms are larger than stand-alone firms
on average. This is because business-group firms not only have better financial conditions
(Figure 1.8) but also have better managerial talents on average (Figure 1.10).
Business-group firms, however, also have larger variances of employment and managerial
talents. Given the persistence of asymmetric financial frictions, the large number of unpro-
ductive business-group firms can distort resource allocation in an equilibrium. Note that
the distributions of business-group firms are bimodal. Small, unproductive business-group
firms coexist with large, productive business-group firms. This observation complies with
the occupational choice that the rich but unproductive choose to become business-group
entrepreneurs regardless of the degree of financial frictions (Figure 1.4).
(a) (b)
Figure 1.9: Firm Size Distributions Measured by Employment
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(a) (b)
Figure 1.10: Distributions of Managerial Talent (TFP)
Given that pyramidal business groups have financial advantage but also have more dis-
persed productivities, the effects of pyramidal business groups on resource allocation are
ambiguous. Their financial advantage makes business-group firms not only to raise more
capital but also to allocates more capital to low productive business-group firms. The fol-
lowing Observation 5 shows that the net effects of pyramidal business groups depend on the
level of financial frictions, τ .
Observation 5 (Factor Prices and Aggregate Inputs). As the strength of investor protection
(1− τ) improves in an economy with business groups, both the rate of return on capital and
wage increase monotonically, while both the capital stock and labor force increase first and
then decrease.
Figure 1.11 captures correlations between factor prices and aggregate inputs in the degree
of financial frictions. It shows that positive correlations between factor prices and aggregate
inputs are broken under the prevalence of business groups. The existence of business groups
helps an economy achieve a large amount of aggregate inputs under the moderate level of
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financial frictions such as τ ∈ [0.3, 0.7]. However, a further decrease in financial frictions
from τ = 0.2 only pushes up factor prices and results in the smaller aggregate inputs of an
economy. This non-monotonicity contrasts with strictly positive correlations between factor
prices and aggregate inputs in an economy without business groups.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1.11: Factor Prices and Aggregate Inputs
This negative correlation observed in Figure 1.11 derives from a decrease in savings of the
rich. The following Table 1.3 captures savings of the rich13 whose wealth is top 0.14% in an
economy with business groups. It shows that the rich who choose to create business groups
13I choose a(13) = 398 as the criteria for the rich because the population of individuals whose wealth
is greater than or equal to 398 hardly changes as financial frictions decrease: the population changes from
0.147% with τ = 0.5 to 0.136% with τ = 0.1%.
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save less as financial frictions decrease. The level of their savings decreases from 0.88 to 0.53,
and the share of their savings decreases from 52% to 33%. This decrease in savings can be
supported by the financial advantage of business-group entrepreneurs, which allows them to
substitute external finance for private finance. With the same amount of wealth, business-
group entrepreneurs can consume more and save less by raising more external capital as
financial frictions decrease.
The Degree of Financial Frictions τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5
An Economy with Business Groups
Savings of the Rich (Share of Capital Stock) 0.53(33%) 0.88(52%)
Population of the Rich 0.14% 0.15%
An Economy without Business Groups
Savings of the Rich (Share of Capital Stock) 0.93(47%) 0.52(35%)
Population of the Rich 0.21% 0.11%
Table 1.3: Savings of the Rich
The Degree of Financial Frictions τ = 0.1 τ = 0.5
Wealth of SA Entrepreneurs (Share of Total Wealth) 0.46(18%) 1.04(40%)
Population of SA Entrepreneurs 5.24% 5.78%
Table 1.4: Wealth of Stand-Alone Entrepreneurs in an Economy with Business Groups
It is interesting that the savings of the rich would be monotonically increasing with
investor protection if we shut down the possibility of creating business groups. In an economy
without business groups, savings of the rich increase from 35% to 47% as financial frictions
decrease from τ = 0.5 to τ = 0.1. Note that the population of the rich increases,14 which
14Given the criteria of the rich, a ≥ a(13) = 398, the population of the rich in an economy without
business groups increases from 0.11% with τ = 0.5 to 0.21% with τ = 0.1.
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implies that the lower financial frictions help the talented accumulate wealth in an economy
without business groups.
In an economy dominated by business groups, however, its stagnating population of the
rich suggests that the poor but talented suffer from the asymmetric financial frictions and
have a difficulty to accumulate their wealth. The above Table 1.4 shows this possibility. The
absolute level of stand-alone entrepreneurs’ wealth decreases from 1.04 to 0.46 as financial
frictions decrease from τ = 0.5 to τ = 0.1, and the share of their wealth also decreases
from 40% to 18%. Note that the population of stand-alone entrepreneurs is barely changed
as financial frictions decrease. This implies that the decrease in stand-alone entrepreneurs’
wealth derives from a decrease in their wealth on average, not from a decrease in the number
of their population.15
Observation 6 (Aggregate Flotation Costs). An economy with business groups consumes
larger flotations costs than an economy without business groups.
Figure 1.12: Flotation Costs
Figure 1.13: Investment Net of Flotation
Costs
Observation 6 teaches us creating a business group can be an efficient choice for an
individual, but not for an economy. As can be seen in Figure 1.12, flotation costs of an
15Appendix A.1 shows that pyramidal business groups can lower the wealth mobility from the bottom to
the top.
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economy with business groups increase faster than an economy without business groups.
Remember that the rich but untalented create business groups by paying flotation costs
in order to launch productive subsidiaries. Thus, incorporating pyramidal business groups
requires larger fixed costs. It is the problem that even though the more parent firms are
incorporated, the fewer subsidiary firms are launched as financial frictions decrease.
Figure 1.13 shows the aggregate flotation costs in an economy with business groups are
sizable. The aggregate investment net of flotation costs decreases as τ goes to zero. This
complies with the observation that as τ goes to zero, the capital stock of an economy with
business groups declines.
One might ask why the net investment declines even though financial frictions decrease
and the rate of return on capital keeps rising. The following Figure 1.14 gives an explanation.
It shows that the investment rate of an economy with business groups is not only larger than
an economy without business groups but also increases monotonically. Thus, a decrease in
financial frictions indeed increases the investment rate of an economy. The excessive flotation
costs used up by business groups, however, overwhelm the increase in investment and result
in the decrease in net investment used for replenishing capital depreciation in a stationary
state equilibrium as τ goes to zero.
Figure 1.14: Investment Rate
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Observation 7 (Aggregate Output). Let’s define aggregate output of an economy as the
sum of aggregate consumption and aggregate investment. Then, the aggregate output of
an economy with business groups does not monotonically increase with investor protection.
When the level of investor protection is strong enough such as (1− τ) ≥ 0.8, an increase in
investor protection does not increase the aggregate output of an economy under the prevalence
of business groups.
Pyramidal business groups make the aggregate output of an economy regress toward a
moderate level over the degree of financial frictions. Figure 1.15 shows that business groups
can partially nullify the impact of financial frictions on aggregate output. At the early stage
of its development where financial frictions are rampant, business groups help an economy
produce larger aggregate output.16 When the tunneling ratio τ goes to zero, however, Figure
1.15 shows that the aggregate output of an economy with business groups is stagnating.
Figure 1.15: Aggregate Output
16Figure 1.15 shows that a little development of investor protection is required for business groups to
help an economy produce more aggregate output. This is because the internal equity finance of business
groups works as leverage for raising capital from external markets. Too large financial frictions can weaken
the efficiency of the financial advantage of pyramidal business groups.
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Observation 7 rebuts an argument that the economic impact of business groups would
spontaneously vanish if investor protection improves. The stagnating aggregate output rather
suggests that achieving good investor protection is not enough to lessen the effects of business
groups on an economy and that aggregate output may not grow without restraining the
prevalence of business groups. As argued in the previous remarks, business groups can
be asymmetrically benefited by the improvement of investor protection in the model. The
stagnating aggregate output of an economy with business groups in Figure 1.15 suggests
that the asymmetric financial frictions become sizable and the benefits of business groups
can be dominated by their costs when the degree of financial frictions is low enough such
that τ ≤ 0.2.
The following Observation 8 shows how sizable the asymmetric financial frictions be-
tween business-group and stand-alone firms are and why dealing with pyramidal ownership
structure is necessary for the development of external capital markets.
Observation 8 (External Capital Markets). Let’s define the size of external capital markets
as the sum of external debt finance and external equity finance used by all firms such that
External Capital Markets =
∫
o(z,a)=SA
{
1− PM(z, a)
}
·
{
kD(z, a) + kE(z, a)
}
dF (z, a)
+
∫
o(z,a)=BG
∑
i∈{1,2}
Ea2
[
kDi (z, a|z2(z, a), a2) + kEi (z, a|z2(z, a), a2)
]
dF (z, a).
(1.53)
Controlling for aggregate output, the external capital markets of an economy with business
groups are smaller than those of an economy without business groups.
Figure 1.16 shows that the underdevelopment of external capital markets can be associ-
ated with the prevalence of business groups in an equilibrium. However, it does not mean
that shutting down business groups increases the size of external capital markets. External
capital markets of an economy with business groups are larger than those of an economy with-
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out business groups given the moderate degree of financial frictions such that τ ∈ [0.3, 0.6],
while they are smaller given the low degree of financial frictions such that τ ≤ 0.2.17 It is
a more precise interpretation of the result that business groups decrease the size of external
capital used by stand-alone firms in an equilibrium. Figure 1.16 shows that more than a half
of external capital is used by business groups and that external capital used by stand-alone
firms is smaller than its counterparts in an economy without business groups.
Figure 1.16: External Capital Markets
This underdevelopment of external capital markets in an economy with business groups
arises due to the asymmetric financial frictions between business-group firms and stand-alone
firms in the model. Note that given the same degree of financial frictions, the price of capital
is always higher in an economy with business groups than that without business groups.
The higher price of capital impairs stand-alone firms’ external financing. Thus, stand-alone
firms, which lack internal capital markets, should suffer from the tighter financial constraints
and cannot but raise less external capital in an economy dominated by business groups.
To summarize, the results of this section show that the endogenous creation of pyramidal
17Note that in Figure 1.16, each point on a line is connected with two adjacent points of tunneling ratio.
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business groups and the asymmetric financial frictions among firms have sizable effects on
resource allocation of an economy. The following section presents a firm-level dataset of
South Korea and tests the model.
1.7 A Case of South Korea
South Korea is one of many countries where the prevalence of pyramidal business groups
is significant.18 I use a firm-level dataset of South Korea, the Survey of Business Structure
and Activities collected by the Korean National Statistical Office from 2006 to 2013, to
compare with the model. This dataset covers all firms in the country having more than fifty
permanent workers and equities larger than 300 millions KRW.19 The number of all firms
observed in the data is around 12000 each year.20 The dataset contains each firm’s ownership
structure information if it has a parent or a subsidiary.21 Lastly, we can observe in the data
since 2010 if a firm is listed in the Korean stock exchange markets, KOSPI or KOSDAQ.
I identify a business-group firm with a listed firm that has a parent or a subsidiary.
Although there are many unlisted firms that have a parent or a subsidiary in the data, I only
identify business-group firms with listed firms because a pyramidal business group defined
in the model is a collection of listed firms, which can tap into external equity markets. Note
that the financial advantage of a pyramidal ownership structure stems from the leverages on
external equity finance in the model.
Stand-alone firms are defined as all firms that are not identified as business-group firms.
Thus, unlisted firms that have parents or subsidiaries are also identified as stand-alone
18See Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011).
19As of March 2016, 300 millions KRW is equivalent to about 250 thousands USD.
20I only use firms in non-finance sectors.
21Only a firm that has more than 50% of shares of another firm is identified as a parent firm in the data.
Thus, the dataset could underestimate the number of business-group firms because a de facto controlling
shareholder usually holds less than 30% of block shares in South Korea.
49
firms.22
1.7.1 The Prevalence of Business Groups
The following Table 1.5 shows the prevalence of business groups measured by the relative
number of business-group firms. You can see that the prevalence of business groups is stable
over the periods. The relative number of business-group firms out of all listed firms is around
0.85, which is more or less the same number observed in the numerical example of the model
given τ ≤ 0.6. See Figure 1.7.
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013
Business-Group Firms / All Listed Firms 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.85
Business-Group Firms / All Firms 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
Table 1.5: The Prevalence of Business Groups Measured by the Relative Number of Firms
The relative number of business-group firms out of all firms is around 0.11. This is larger
than the number observed in the model such as 0.08 at τ = 0.01 or 0.03 at τ = 0.6. Note
that the number of all firms in the data is likely to be underestimated because the dataset
does not include small firms that have fewer than fifty permanent workers or equities smaller
than 300 millions KRW.
22I implicitly assume that unlisted firms are parts of their parents or subsidiaries because unlisted firms
cannot sell their shares and use them as a leverage. However, two cases are ambiguous. One is a unlisted
parent that has a listed subsidiary, and another is a unlisted subsidiary that has a listed parent. The dataset
only offers the existence of a parent or a subsidiary, but not the information whether they are listed or not.
Although not reported in the paper, excluding these two cases shapes stand-alone firms more financially
constrained and smaller such that their capital-to-labor ratios have a smaller mean and a larger variance
and that their employment has a smaller mean and a larger variance.
50
1.7.2 The Asymmetric Financial Frictions Among Firms
Figure 1.17 shows distributions of capital-to-labor ratios for each type of firms. I use a firm’s
fixed assets as its capital. A firm’s labor force is calculated by the sum of permanent and
temporary workers.23
(a) (b)
Figure 1.17: The Distribution of Capital-to-Labor Ratio from 2010 to 2013
The data suggests that the asymmetric financial frictions between business-group and
stand-alone firms are sizable in South Korea. You can see that business-group firms have
a larger mean and a smaller variance of capital-to-labor ratios than stand-alone firms and
that public corporations have more or less the same variance of capital-to-labor ratios with
business-group firms, while their mean is slightly smaller than that of business-group firms.
These results comply well with the numerical example of the model around τ ∈ [0.1, 0.2].
See Figure 1.8.
Technological differences between business-group and stand-alone firms could induce
23Temporary workers consist of a large volume of employment in South Korea. In the dataset, temporary
workers are more than 10% of all labor forces. However, excluding temporary workers from the total
employment barely changes the results.
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these asymmetric capital-to-labor ratios. For instance, business-group firms might be con-
centrated in capital intensive industries. Technological differences, however, cannot explain
the observed patterns in South Korea. First, business groups in South Korea are so diversi-
fied that they have subsidiaries in almost all industries. We can observe the same patterns of
capital-to-labor ratios within an industry such as manufacture or non-finance service sector.
See Appendix A.3. Second, even if business-group firms were concentrated in an industry
such as manufacture, their financial advantage should increase the price of capital in an equi-
librium, which could impair the financial capacity of stand-alone firms in other industries.
1.7.3 The Firm Size Distribution
Figure 1.18 shows the firm size distributions observed in the data measured by employment.
You can see that business-group firms are larger on average and more dispersed than stand-
alone firms. Remember that the model teaches us that a larger variance of business-group
firms can lead to factor misallocation given the asymmetric financial advantage of business-
group firms, which is observed in the previous figure.
Public corporations, however, are smaller on average than business-group firms in Fig-
ure 1.18. This is a salient difference between the data (Figure 1.18) and the model (Figure
1.9). Since public corporations have slightly smaller capital-to-labor ratios on average, the
significantly smaller size of public corporations implies that public corporations can be less
productive than business-group firms on average, which is inconsistent with the model. This
disparity might come from the assumption that managerial talent in the model follows an ex-
ogenous Markov process regardless of ownership structures. In other words, the model lacks
one of the salient benefits of business groups, R&D. In the real world, business groups can use
their financial advantage to improve their productivities endogenously through investment.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1.18: The Distribution of Employment from 2010 to 2013
1.7.4 Aggregate Variables
The dataset of South Korea shows us that most listed firms are members of pyramidal
business groups, that the asymmetric financial frictions between business-group and stand-
alone firms are sizable, and that business-group firms are more dispersed than stand-alone
firms. Thus, we can say that the model captures well the characteristics of firms with respect
to ownership structures.
However, it is still ambiguous that the asymmetric financial frictions derived from pyra-
midal business groups have non-monotonic effects on aggregate inputs and outputs in the
strength of investor protection. A future research is required to test predictions of the model.
Preliminary results are presented in Appendix A.3.
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1.8 Conclusion
Financial frictions can cause resource misallocation. They are understood as one of the
major hindrances to economic development. Although many researchers have shown why
and to what extent financial frictions affect an economy, few macroeconomic models have
investigated private institutions that can arise as endogenous reactions against financial
frictions. In this paper, I study the endogenous creation of pyramidal business groups and
focus on the repercussions of their financial advantage given capital market imperfections.
There are three main implications of the model. First, pyramidal business groups can
be efficient private institutions if external capital markets are underdeveloped due to severe
financial frictions. Second, the asymmetric financial frictions between business-group and
stand-alone firms can create inefficiencies that impair stand-alone firms’ external financing
in an equilibrium. Third, the prevalence of business groups does not spontaneously shrink
as investor protection improves.
The last implication is indeed a limitation of this paper. The unvarying number of
business-group firms in the model cannot explain why the prevalence of business groups
differs across developed countries. Thus, finding a rationale for the cross-country difference
can be an interesting topic for future research. For instance, Kandel, Kosenko, Morck, and
Yafeh (2015) argue that the U.S. pyramidal business groups have almost disappeared because
the U.S. government pursued specific policy measures to regulate business groups such as
the Public Utility Holding Company Act (1935) and rising inter-corporate dividend taxation
(after 1935). We can use the model developed in this paper to do a counter-factual analysis
that examines how effectively the regulations adopted in the U.S. can reduce the prevalence
of business groups and undo factor misallocation spawned by business groups.
A stationary equilibrium employed in this paper cannot measure the dynamic effects
of business groups on welfare over time. Even though an economy dominated by business
54
groups can feature smaller aggregate consumption and output, it does not mean that shutting
down business groups immediately improves welfare because it takes time for an economy to
accumulate capital stock and because in the transition periods, the economy should suffer
from lower TFP. It is an interesting future research that simplifies the model, tracks down
transition periods, and examines dynamic effects of changes in policies.24 A challenge is
computation burden in order to deal with equilibriums over time.
Lastly, another follow-up research agenda can be the effects of pyramidal business groups
on wealth inequality and socioeconomic mobility. The model developed in this paper sug-
gests that the rich can entrench their wealth by building up pyramidal business groups,
which results in a decrease in the probability of the poor accumulating wealth. Given the
assumption that the inequality of entrepreneurial productivity stems from luck, business
groups could be an institution that allows the rich to insure their wealth against their bad
luck. This entrenchment of the rich implies that in an equilibrium, the prevalence of business
groups can prevent the poor from exploiting their good luck. Thus, we can use the model
to study how pyramidal business groups can change the patterns of wealth inequality and
socioeconomic mobility. Preliminary results are presented in Appendix A.1.
24e.g. Buera and Shin (2013); Buera, Moll, and Shin (2013)
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Chapter 2
Peasants in the City: Consequences of
Declining Labor Shares
2.1 Introduction
A recent debate on declining labor shares often focuses on the elasticity of substitution
between factors of production, which is a key parameter of production functions many
macroeconomic models hinge on. For instance, by estimating the elasticity greater than
one Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014b) attribute the declining labor shares to a decrease in
the relative price of investment goods. However, it is unclear that the elasticity of substitu-
tion is greater than one. Many studies report the opposite: Klump, McAdam, and Willman
(2012) and Oberfield and Raval (2014) report that the estimates are less than one.1
Borrowing from Houthakker (1955) and Jones (2005), I show that a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function can be consistent with a technology that uses capital to substitute for other
factors and changes factor shares. The seemingly inconsistent estimates of the elasticity of
1The substitution of capital for labor is not the only possible determinant of the recent declining labor
shares. A declining unionization or a rising offshoring might be possible causes for the declining labor shares.
See Elsby et al. (2013).
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substitution can be reconciled with the substitution technology because endogenous choices
of the labor-saving technology can equip an economy with two iso-quants, one taking the
technology and another not taking the technology. The envelope of these iso-quants can
shape a production function with the elasticity greater than one even though each iso-quant
implies the elasticity less than or equal to one.
Given this observation, I use a simple two-sector model to show that changes in factor
shares can be tightly linked to changes in employment shares, factor prices, and income
inequality. The industrial revolution is viewed as a technological progress that allows capital
to substitute for both land and labor in agriculture.2 The model shows that an increase in
the substitutability for both land and labor in agriculture can push population out from the
rural area to the urban area where the employment share of manufacture is higher than the
rural area.
Recent advances in information technologies are viewed as a technological progress that
allows capital to substitute for labor in manufacture and decreases labor shares.3 This
implies that declining labor shares in manufacture that demands less labor can intensify
the agglomeration to the city where dominant industries are non-manufacture and where a
labor-saving technology is still unadopted.
The model shows that the recent declining labor shares in manufacture can change factor
prices. First, the price of land can increases. A substitution technology in manufacture
decreases the employment share of manufacture and increases the employment share of non-
manufacture industries in the city where the substitution technology is still unadopted.
Given the fixed supply of land, the marginal productivity of land increases because the ratio
2Steam engines use fossil fuel to substitute for land that was virtually the only source of energy before
the revolution. Tapping into seemingly unlimited source of energy, the economy can keep growing by using
a Solow production technology that is not restricted by the limited supply of land (Hansen and Prescott,
2002).
3Koh, Santaeulalia-Llopis, and Zheng (2015) show that an increase in intellectual property capital such
as software can account for the recent declining labor shares in the United States.
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of labor to land increases.
Second, the price of labor can decreases. Capital is not accumulated enough to compen-
sate for the rising labor forces in non-manufacture industries. To keep the interest rate fixed,
which is determined by a time preference, the ratio of capital to labor is pushed down as the
ratio of capital to land increases due to the fixed supply of land. As a result, even though
aggregate output increases with a technological progress that allows capital to substitute for
labor in manufacture, the marginal productivity of labor in an equilibrium can decrease.
Lastly, the model suggests that the dispersion of labor productivities can be larger as
labor shares in manufacture decrease. A technology that substitutes capital for labor in
manufacture increases the elasticity of labor demand with respect to labor augmenting tech-
nologies and shapes the right tale of a labor productivity distribution thicker. Thus, labor
productivities are bipolarized into two distributions, a fatter right tale Pareto distribution
of manufacture with fewer labor forces and a Pareto distribution of non-manufacture with
larger labor forces immigrated from manufacture.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces a technology that sub-
stitutes capital for other factors to show that this substitution technology can change factor
shares without discarding a Cobb-Douglas production function. Section 3 remarks on a tech-
nology that substitutes capital for labor. Section 4 studies consequences of declining labor
shares in two different cases: a decline in agriculture and a decline in manufacture. Section
5 concludes.
2.2 A Technology Generating a Cobb-Douglas Produc-
tion Function and Changing Factor Shares
Houthakker (1955) and Jones (2005) show that a Cobb-Douglas production function can
be derived from stochastic factor augmenting technologies following Pareto distributions.
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Suppose that output is produced by a local production technology, F˜ , such that
Y = F (K,X) = max
i=1,...,N
F˜ (biK, aiX) . (2.1)
K stands for capital, and X stands for the other factor such as land or labor. Assume that
a pair of ideas, (bi, ai), is drawn from independent Pareto distributions as follows.
Pr[ai ≤ a] = 1−
(
a
γa
)−α
, ai ≥ γa > 0
Pr[bi ≤ b] = 1−
(
b
γb
)−β
, bi ≥ γb > 0
(2.2)
Given that a local production technology is Leontief, F˜ (biK, aiX) = min{biK, aiX}, a global
production function, F (K,X), converges to Cobb-Douglas as the number of ideas N goes to
infinity such that
E[Y ] ≈
(
γNKβXα
) 1
α+β , γ = γαa γ
β
b . (2.3)
Now, suppose that an economy can embody a substitution technology, f
(
Ks
X
)
, which
allows capital to substitute for the other factor.
F
(
K,X; f
(
Ks
X
))
= max
i=1,...,N
F˜
(
bi(K −Ks), aiX · f
(
Ks
X
))
given Ks ∈ [0, K] (2.4)
f
(
Ks
X
)
captures development of a substitution technology. I assume f
(
Ks
X
)
is a X-augmenting
technology which is a function of capital per X. For instance, fertilizer decreases the mini-
mum requirement of land and labor producing a unit of crops. Similarly, a computer is an
exoskeleton that increases the efficiency of a unit labor force and decreases the minimum
requirement of labor forces producing a unit of industrial products.
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The above production function with the substitution technology can be rewritten as
F
(
K,L; f
(
Ks
X
))
= max
i=1,...,N
F˜ (bi(K −Ks), a′iX) given Ks ∈ [0, K] (2.5)
where
Pr[a′i ≤ a] = 1−
 a
γaf
(
Ks
X
)
−α , a′i ≥ γaf (KsX
)
> 0
Pr[bi ≤ b] = 1−
(
b
γb
)−β
, bi ≥ γb > 0.
(2.6)
As N goes to infinity, the production function converges to a Cobb-Douglas function.
E
[
F
(
K,X; f
(
Ks
X
))]
≈
(
γαa γ
β
bN
{
f
(
Ks
X
)}α
(K −Ks)βXα
) 1
α+β
(2.7)
Lastly, let’s assume the following functional form of a substitution technology,
f
(
Ks
X
)
=
(
Ks/ξ
X
)s
, s ∈ [0, 1], (2.8)
where ξ captures the relative price of the substitution technology and s is the degree of substi-
tutability. Then, the production function is optimized by choosing the level of substitution,
Ks
X
, such that
E[Y ] = max
Ks
E
[
F
(
K,X; f
(
Ks
X
))]
≈ max
Ks
(
γαa γ
β
bN
{
f
(
Ks
X
)}α
(K −Ks)βXα
) 1
α+β
as N →∞
= max
Ks
((
γa
ξs
)α
γβbNK
αs
s (K −Ks)βXα−αs
) 1
α+β
=
(
γ′NKβ+αsXα−αs
) 1
α+β , γ′ = γαa γ
β
b
(
1
ξ
)αs (
αs
αs+ β
)αs (
β
αs+ β
)β
.
(2.9)
Note that the production function with the substitution technology is isomorphic to the
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Cobb-Douglas production function without the substitution technology but changes in the
distribution of ideas: from β to β + αs and from α to α − αs. Thus, the substitution
technology f is nothing but changes in factor shares of the production function such that
Y ′ = max
i=1,...,N
F˜ (biK, aiX) (2.10)
where
Pr[ai ≤ a] = 1−
(
a
γ′a
)−α′
, α′ = α− αs, γ′a = γa
(
αs
ξ (αs+ β)
)s
Pr[bi ≤ b] = 1−
(
b
γ′b
)−β′
, β′ = β + αs, γ′b =
γbβ
αs+ β ,
(2.11)
converging into
E[Y ′] ≈
(
γ′NKβ
′
Xα
′) 1α′+β′ , γ′ = γ′aα′γ′bβ′ . (2.12)
2.3 Remarks on a Technology Substituting Capital for
Labor
Suppose that a production requires two factors, capital (K) and labor (X = L). Given the
local Leontief production technology, the optimal labor demand required to produce a unit
output is proportional to the inverse of the labor augmenting technology such that L∗ ∼ 1
a
.
As the number of ideas N grows by drawing new ideas, the expected growth rate of the labor
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productivity measured by 1
L∗ conditional on non-negative growth is
E
[
1/L′ − 1/L
1/L
∣∣∣∣∣L′ < L
]
∼ E
[
a′ − a
a
∣∣∣∣∣ a′ > a
]
=
∫ ∞
a
a′ − a
a
· αaαa′−α−1da′
= αaα−1
(
a−α+1
α− 1 −
a−α+1
α
)
= 1
α− 1
(2.13)
where the second equation holds under the assumption that labor augmenting technology
follows a Pareto distribution.
From the above result, we can see that α captures the scarcity of labor augmenting
technology. The higher α means the lower probability of finding a better labor augmenting
technology a and the lower growth rate of the labor productivity measured by 1
L∗ . Note
that a Cobb-Douglas production function features α
α+β labor shares, which increases with α.
Thus, the above model tells us that the scarcer a factor is, the higher shares it takes.
Now, given the substitution technology f
(
Ks/ξ
L
)s
, the optimal labor demand is changed
such that L∗1−s ∼ 1
a
and the expected growth rate of the labor productivity conditional on
non-negative growth becomes
E
[
1/L′ − 1/L
1/L
∣∣∣∣∣L′ < L
]
∼ E
 a′ 11−s − a 11−s
a
1
1−s
∣∣∣∣∣∣ a′ > a

=
∫ ∞
a
a′
1
1−s − a 11−s
a
1
1−s
· αaαa′−α−1da′
= αaα−
1
1−s
a−α+ 11−s
α− 11−s
− a
−α+ 11−s
α

= 1(1− s)α− 1 .
(2.14)
Given s ∈ (0, 1), we can observe that the substitution technology increases the conditional
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expected growth rate of the labor productivity from 1
α−1 to
1
(1−s)α−1 . This is because the
substitution technology is a scale-free replication device of labor. It amplifies the productivity
of labor as a factor of f
(
Ks/ξ
L
)s
regardless of the level of a. Thus, the substitution technology
increase the elasticity of the optimal labor demand such that −d logL∗
d log a =
1
1−s .
In fact, it is a Pareto distribution of labor augmenting technology that results in the
scale-free growth rate of the labor productivity.4 Note that α is the shape parameter of
a Pareto distribution, Pr[ai ≤ a] = 1 −
(
a
γa
)−α
. As α decreases, the right tale of Pareto
distribution becomes fatter and the probability of drawing a better labor augmenting tech-
nology a increases. Moreover, the variance of a Pareto distribution increases as α decreases.
This implies that the shape parameter α of a Pareto distribution can be understood as the
inverse degree of labor productivity dispersion. Thus, we can understand that a substitution
technology decreasing α′ = (1 − s)α not only increases the expected growth rate of labor
productivity but also results in the more dispersed labor productivities across production
units.
Implications of a Technological Progress Substituting Capital for Labor
• The labor share of income α′ decreases with s, the degree of substitutability.
• The relative price of substitution technology ξ determines whether substitution tech-
nology is implemented.
• Due to the endogenous choice of substitution technology, an economy can embody two
different production functions, one with substitution technology (Ks > 0) and one
without substitution technology (Ks = 0). Thus, the elasticity of substitution can be
measured greater than 1 given two Cobb-Douglas iso-quant curves.
4Gabaix (1999) shows that a scale-free random growth process with a positive lower bound can generate
a Pareto distribution with the inverse degree of dispersion such that α = ameanamean−amin .
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• The labor share of income α′ can decline due to a decrease in the price of substitution
technology ξ because the lower ξ is, the more production units implement the substi-
tution technology. This extensive margin of moving from α to α − αs can decrease
aggregate labor shares. With the low enough price of substitution technology, however,
every production unit already adopts the substitution technology and labor share α′ is
bounded below α− αs regardless of ξ.
• If we can map a wage profile into the distribution of labor-augmenting technology, ai,
the wage dispersion increases with the degree of substitution s because the dispersion
of Pareto distribution is a decreasing function of α such that
SD(ai)
MEAN(ai)
=
√
1
α(α− 2) where Pr[ai ≤ a] = 1−
(
a
γa
)−α
, α > 2.
2.4 Consequences of Asymmetric Changes in Factor
Shares
2.4.1 From Plows to Steam Engines That Substitutes Capital for
Land and Labor in Agriculture
Industrial revolution changed the path of economic growth. Arguably, steam engines were
the most important invention of the revolution. Steam engines allowed human to be free
from cultivating land which was practically the only source of usable energy. Steam engines
allowed capital to substitute for land, to be accumulated, and hence to serve for sustained
economic growth. Pollan (2006) tells us a vivid story that we are in essence eating crude
oil because foods we consume are cultivated by manufactured products such as chemical
fertilizer, pesticide, or tractors. Hansen and Prescott (2002) use the idea of substitution for
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land and build a growth model in which the path of economic growth is transformed from
the world of Malthus to that of Solow.
Workers in Urban Area
Let’s consider a two-sector economy consisting of agriculture in the rural area (A) and
manufacture in the urban area (M). Suppose that agricultural goods are produced with
capital KA, labor LA, and land X. In contrast, manufactured goods are produced by a
Solow production technology in which only capital KM and labor LM are required. In other
words, the land share of manufacture is assumed to be zero.
There are L infinitely lived households. Each household has a unit of inelastic labor
force and sells it in the market with wage w. Suppose that a household selling its labor in
agriculture lives in the rural area and that a household selling its labor in manufacture lives
in the urban area. Each household consumes both agricultural goods cA and manufactured
goods cM . With some conventional assumptions, the economy can be described by the
following problem.
max
∞∑
t=0
ρt
(
cθAA,tc
θM
M,t
)
, θA + θM < 1, ρ < 1 (2.15)
subject to
L · cA,t ≤ YA,t = ZA
(
KβAA,tL
αA
A,tX
χ
) 1
βA+αA+χ
L · {cM,t + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt} ≤ YM,t = ZM
(
KβMM,tL
αM
M,t
) 1
βM+αM
Kt = KA,t +KM,t
L = LA,t + LM,t
(2.16)
In a steady state with zero capital depreciation δ = 0, the following first order conditions
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hold where PA is the relative price of agricultural goods.
PAYA
θA
= YM
θM
wA =
αA
βA + αA + χ
PAYA
LA
wM =
αM
βM + αM
YM
LM
(2.17)
Given the factor price equalization, the rural population is pinned down by
LA
L
=
(
1 + βA + αA + χ
βM + αM
· αM
αA
· θM
θA
)−1
. (2.18)
The above equation tells us several features of declining labor shares in agriculture. First,
labor forces are pushed out from the rural area ∆LA
L
< 0 as the substitution technology in
agriculture increases ∆βA > 0. Given the fixed number of labor forces, this means that the
urban agglomeration is intensified.
Labor forces have immigrated from the rural area to the urban area as an economy grows.
Lucas (2004) argues that cities are better places for accumulating human capital and hence
attract labor forces given the stagnating agricultural sector in the countrysides. What I
argue here is the opposite side of the same coin explained by him: Labor forces are not only
pulled into the urban area but also are pushed out from the rural area. A feature of the push
story is that factor price equalization holds naturally. Wedges compensating for productivity
gap between two regions such as externality on human capital or preference for amenity are
not required. Since the rural population is not the residual of the urban population, the
productivity in the countrysides does not need to be lower than that in the cities.
Second, sectoral TFPs captured by ZA and ZM are irrelevant to the urban agglomeration
in the model. This is because consumption shares are constant for each sector given a specific
form of preferences. If consumption share of agriculture decreases as the economy grows such
66
that ∆θA < 0, the urban agglomeration can be intensified.
Lastly, equilibrium wage does not change even though labor demand in agriculture de-
creases. This is because the level of capital is increased in order to keep the interest rate
constant such that 1 + r = 1
ρ
. Look at the following equations.
w = αM
βM
rKM
LM
, r = βM
βM + αM
ZM
(
LM
KM
) αM
βM+αM (2.19)
∆w = 0 given ∆r = ∆
(
KM
LM
)
= 0 (2.20)
Given ∆βA > 0, labor forces are pushed out from agriculture into manufacture ∆LM > 0.
In a stationary state, however, interest rate is fixed constant and hence the ratio of capital
to labor in manufacture
(
KM
LM
)
also should be fixed. As a result, capital in manufacture
increases in order to compensate for the increase in labor such that ∆KM
LM
= 0. The intact
wage level is possible because capital in manufacture can be accumulated. If any factor is
bounded above, declining labor shares can decreases the equilibrium wage. We can see this
in the next section.
2.4.2 From Steam Engines to Computers That Substitutes Capital
for Labor in Manufacture
The object of this section is to answer a question: What will occur if information technology
such as computers, robots, and artificial intelligence substitutes capital for human labor
forces in manufacture? Where do the labor forces go? Do any qualitative changes take
place? Although general public often speculates a grim future, the answer is unclear. For
instance, information technology can increase the marginal productivity of labor at least in
manufacture.
To answer the question, I use a simple two-sector model again with an assumption that
67
the land share of income is sizable in non-manufacture industries, especially in the city.
Land is assumed as a production factor offering economies of agglomeration such as search-
ing, matching, or networking. This implies that a production function in the city can be
isomorphic to that in agriculture: non-zero land share of income χ > 0. Let’s abstract
from agriculture and suppose that A stands for non-manufacture industries or agglomera-
tion economies in the city. Accordingly, suppose that M stands for manufacture.
Peasants in the City
For convenience, let’s write the problem again.
max
∞∑
t=0
ρt
(
cθAA,tc
θM
M,t
)
, θA + θM < 1, ρ < 1 (2.21)
subject to
L · cA,t ≤ YA,t = ZA
(
KβAA,tL
αA
A,tX
χ
) 1
βA+αA+χ
L · {cM,t + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt} ≤ YM,t = ZM
(
KβMM,tL
αM
M,t
) 1
βM+αM
Kt = KA,t +KM,t
L = LA,t + LM,t
(2.22)
Now, the question is what happens in a stationary state if the rise of a substitution
technology, ∆βM > 0, decreases labor shares in manufacture, ∆ αMβM+αM < 0.
5 First, factor
price equalization tells us that labor forces in the city increases ∆LA
L
> 0 as ∆βM > 0 such
that
LA
L
=
(
1 + βA + αA + χ
βM + αM
· αM
αA
· θM
θA
)−1
. (2.23)
5I assume δ = 0 for brevity. In the model, an increase in the depreciation rate of information technology
can be implicitly captured by the large relative price of the substitution technology ξ governing the efficiency
of a substitution technology, f
(
Ks/ξ
L
)s
. Note that a production unit adopts the substitution technology f
only if ξ is small enough to be profitable.
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Second, land price in the city increases. Note that a substitution technology in manu-
facture is endogenous in that the technology is used only if adopting it produces more than
before such that ∆ (PMYM) > 0.6 By construction, an increase in manufactured goods means
an expansion of non-manufacture industries such that ∆YA = θAθM ∆ (PMYM) > 0. Given the
Cobb-Douglas production function in an economy, both the land share of income and the
land supply in the city are fixed such that ∆χ = ∆X = 0. Thus, the relative price of land
should increase with the rise of the substitution technology in manufacture such that
∆
(
YA − rKA − wLA
X
)
= χ
βA + αA + χ
∆YA
X
> 0 given ∆βM > 0. (2.24)
Lastly, the equilibrium wage decreases with declining labor shares in manufacture. As can
be seen above, the production of non-manufacture industries increases such that ∆YA > 0
as ∆βM > 0, and hence capital incomes in the city where non-manufacture industries are
dominant also increase such that ∆ (rKA) = βAβA+αA+χ∆YA > 0. Given the interest rate fixed
in a stationary state, this implies that capital in the city is accumulated such that ∆KA > 0.
Note that the land supply in the city is fixed ∆X = 0, that the ratio of land to capital
decreases ∆
(
X
KA
)
< 0, and that the ratio of labor to capital increases ∆
(
LA
KA
)
> 0 in order
to keep the interest rate fixed. As a result, the equilibrium wage w decreases such that
w = αA
βA
rKA
LA
, r = βA
βA + αA + χ
ZA
(
LA
KA
) αA
βA+αA+χ
(
X
KA
) χ
βA+αA+χ (2.25)
∆w = αA
βA
r ·∆
(
KA
LA
)
< 0. (2.26)
It is the fixed supply of land in the city that decreases the equilibrium wage and makes
land a scarcer factor when labor forces are flooded into the city. Thus, in contrast to the
substitution of capital for labor and land in agriculture, the recent substitution of capital
6PM is the relative price of manufactured goods. I use the price of non-manufactured goods as a numeraire
because no technological changes occur in non-manufacture industries.
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for labor in manufacture can decrease the equilibrium wage.
Note that the equilibrium wage w can increase with the productivity of non-manufacture,
ZA. A technology raising ZA can neutralize the declining wage derived from the declining
labor shares in manufacture because an increase in ZA can accumulate capital to keep the
interest rate r fixed and push down the ratio of labor to capital, LA
KA
. Given that information
technology is not only a substitution technology that decreases labor shares but also a
general technology that increases TFPs, it is worth studying whether advances in information
technology are applied more to the substitution of capital for labor or more to the increase
in TFPs.7
2.5 Conclusion
The labor share of income has significantly declined since the early 1980’s in the United States
(Elsby et al., 2013), and this declining pattern has occurred in many countries (Karabarbou-
nis and Neiman, 2014a,b). Declining labor shares are often understood as a consequence of
information technology that substitutes capital for labor given a production function with
an elasticity of substitution greater than one. Borrowing from Houthakker (1955) and Jones
(2005), I show that labor shares can decrease without the help of an elasticity of substitu-
tion greater than one and that a Cobb-Douglass production function can be derived given a
technology that substitutes capital for labor.
With this observation, I study economic consequences of declining labor shares in manu-
facture. A simple two-sector model is used to show that declining labor shares in manufacture
7Note that a substitution technology in the model changes not only the shape parameters of Pareto
distributions, α and β, but also the minimum factor augmenting technologies, γa and γb. In addition,
The model generating a Cobb-Douglas production function tells us that the TFP of a production function
increases with the minimum factor productivities such that F (K,L) ∼
(
γαa γ
β
b
) 1
α+β . Thus, adopting a
technology that substitutes capital for labor in one sector is likely to increase the TFP of the sector but not
the TFPs of the other sectors.
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can result in a widening dispersion of labor productivities, a declining labor price, and a ris-
ing land price. These changes are often speculated to be closely related, but underlying
forces that shape these concurrent changes, if any, have been unclear (Jones, 2015). This
paper proposes a possible link among these changes through the lens of a technology that
substitutes capital for labor in manufacture.
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Chapter 3
Synchronized Durable Goods
Purchases and the Business Cycle
3.1 Introduction
This paper examines the possibility that changes in the number of households simultaneously
purchasing durable goods can create a business cycle. I build a model in which households
optimize their timings of durable goods purchases given adjustment costs, which can be
derived from the indivisibility and the irreversibility of durable goods.
In the model, a household can deliver its wealth from today to the future by holding
money to purchase durable goods, and a household’s optimal timing of replacing durable
goods depends on the rate of return on money. Thus, a shock common to all households
such as a unexpected change in the inflation rate can alter the timing distribution of durable
goods purchases across households and create aggregate demand fluctuation that propagates
over time.
For instance, suppose that an economy is hit by a unexpected shock such that the gov-
ernment increases an expected inflation rate by printing money more than what it has an-
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nounced. This unexpected increase in the inflation rate decreases the rate of return on money
and forces households to readjust their optimal timings of durable goods purchases. Given
the lower rate of return on money, some households that save too much are bunched into a
group that purchases durable goods as soon as possible. As a result, the aggregate demand
of durable goods can rise in the short run and stimulate the economy. However, the bunching
of durable goods purchases today derives an inevitable lack of aggregate demand tomorrow.
Note that the homogenized, stationary schedules of durable goods purchases across house-
holds are destroyed and that the number of households simultaneously purchasing durable
goods fluctuates over time. In other words, a boom stimulated by an expansionary monetary
shock can be followed up by a recession.
Related Literature
Grossman and Laroque (1990) show that with adjustment costs, an individual’s optimal
durable goods purchase can be intermittent and follow a wait-and-purchase pattern, so called
a (S,s) strategy. Their intuition is clear. A continuous replacement of durable goods is
expensive due to adjustment costs, and an individual can be better off by waiting and
repurchasing a lumpy amount of durable goods. Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) generalize the
idea by allowing non-durable goods consumption together with durable goods purchases.
Adjustment costs of durable goods affect not only individuals’ optimizations but also
aggregate consumption. Caballero (1993) shows that an individual’s (S,s) pattern can ex-
plain excessive smoothness of consumption in aggregate level. This is achieved by an ergodic
consumption schedule distribution across individuals. Similarly, by aggregating individual’s
(S,s) behavior with consumption commitment, Chetty and Szeidl (2016) derive a habit for-
mation model as a reduced form. These studies exhibit the fact that an individual’s lumpy
durable goods consumption can give a macroeconomic implication, which is barely captured
by standard assumptions such as convex consumption sets without adjustment costs.
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Lastly, the idea of synchronized durable goods purchases as a source of the business
cycle has been studied by several economists. To my knowledge, De Gregorio, Guidotti,
and Vegh (1998) are the first to present a model of synchronized durable goods purchases.
They show that an inflation stabilization policy can have significant effects on the business
cycle through the bunching of durable goods purchases. Leahy and Zeira (2005) use an
overlapping generation model to show that even allowing for non-durable goods consumption,
the bunching of durable goods purchases still have sizable effects on aggregate demand.
3.2 A Model
Suppose that an economy consists of H number of infinitely-lived households. Each house-
hold supplies its labor n(t) and earns wage w(t) such that w(t)n(t). It derives utility
from consuming the flow of non-durable goods c(t) and holding the stock of durable goods
s(t). Durable goods a household holds depreciate over time with the rate of δ such that
ds(t) = −δs(t)dt. Suppose that the stock of durable goods s(t) is indivisible and irreversible
in the sense that a household has to sell its existing stock of durable goods and purchase a
new one in order to adjust the existing stock of durable goods.
Let’s assume that the economy has an aggregate production technology F such that
F (N,S) = w¯N + (1− κ)S, κ ∈ (0, 1), (3.1)
where N and S are the aggregate supply of labor and the aggregate supply of second-hand
durable goods households sell, respectively. w¯ is the average labor productivity of households
such that w¯ =
∑
h
wh·nh
N
where N = ∑h nh. Given adjustment costs captured by κ ∈ (0, 1),
the optimal durable goods purchase must be infrequent or intermittent over time because
any continuous readjustment of durable goods can be dominated by a wait-and-consume
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strategy due to the positive adjustment costs.
Then, we can write a household’s problem as follows. T is the optimal timing of replacing
durable goods, and m and s is the real money balance and the stock of durable goods a
household holds at t = 0, respectively.
V (m, s) = max
c(t),n(t),T,m′,s′
E0
[∫ T
0
e−ρt
{
u
(
c(t), e−δts
)
− χn(t)
1+1/ν
1 + 1/ν
}
dt+ e−ρTV (m′, s′)
]
(3.2)
subject to
m′ + s′ ≤ E0
[
(1− κ)e−δT s+
∫ T
0
e−µ(t)(T−t) {w(t)n(t) + τ(t)− c(t)} dt+ e−
∫ T
0 µ(t) dtm
]
m′ ≥ m,
(3.3)
where µ(t), τ(t), andm are the inflation rate, the real money transfer from the government to
a household, and the borrowing limit for a household, respectively. Note that the borrowing
limit m only works when a household purchases its durable goods. Thus, as long as a
household meets the borrowing condition at t = T , it can consume non-durable goods
without any frictions.
Suppose that the utility function u(c, s) satisfies the following standard conditions,
u1 > 0, lim
c→0u1(c, s) =∞, u2 > 0, lims→0u2(c, s) =∞, u11 < 0, u22 < 0, andu12 ≥ 0.
Then, the following market clearing condition characterizes an equilibrium .
H∑
h=1
ch(t) +
H∑
h=1
s′h · 1Th(t)=0 =
H∑
h=1
wh(t)nh(t) + (1− κ)
H∑
h=1
sh(t) · 1Th(t)=0 (3.4)
The LHS of the equation is the demand of non-durable goods consumption and durable
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goods purchases, and the RHS is the supply of labor forces and second-hand durable goods
net of adjustment costs. Note that only a fraction of households with Th(t) = 0 contributes
both the demand and the supply of durable goods, while all households consume non-durable
goods and supply labor forces.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the inflation rate µ(t) satisfies the following condition.
µ(t) > −ρ ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
Then, the labor supply n(t) increases and the non-durable consumption c(t) decreases over
time such that
dn(t)
dt
> 0 and dc(t)
dt
< 0.
Proof. Let’s rewrite the above problem as a Lagrangian such that
V (m, s) = E0
[∫ T
0
e−ρt
{
u
(
c(t), e−δts
)
− χn(t)
1+1/ν
1 + 1/ν
}
dt+ e−ρTV (m′, s′)
]
+ λTE0
[
(1− κ)e−δT s+
∫ T
0
e−µ(t)(T−t) {w(t)n(t) + τ(t)− c(t)} dt+ e−
∫ T
0 µ(t) dtm−m′ − s′
]
+ λm(m′ −m).
(3.5)
Then, the envelope condition with respect to m gives
V1(m, s) = E0
[
e−
∫ T
0 µ(t)dt
]
λT , (3.6)
and the first order conditions with respect to n(t) and c(t) are
χn(t)1/ν = w(t)e(µ(t)+ρ)t−µ(t)TλT ,
u1(c(t), e−δts) = e(µ(t)+ρ)t−µ(t)TλT .
(3.7)
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By substituting the envelope condition into the first order conditions,
n(t) = E0
[
exp
{
ν(µ(t) + ρ)t− νµ(t)T + ν
∫ T
0
µ(x)dx
}]{
w(t)
χ
V1(m, s)
}ν
,
u1
(
c(t), e−δts
)
= E0
[
exp
{
(µ(t) + ρ)t− µ(t)T +
∫ T
0
µ(x)dx
}]
V1(m, s).
(3.8)
Then, it is immediate that dn(t)
dt
> 0 and dc(t)
dt
< 0 given µ(t) > −ρ for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proposition 3 tells us that changes in the timing distribution of durable goods purchases
across households can affect not only the aggregate demand of non-durable goods consump-
tion but also the aggregate supply of labor forces. Specifically, it shows that an increase in
the number of households that are about to purchase durable goods can increase the ag-
gregate supply of labor forces and help the model achieve an equilibrium by clearing goods
market featuring the bunching of households that purchase durable goods simultaneously.
Proposition 4. A household’s non-durable consumption c(t) is proportional to its stock of
durable goods s(t).
Proof. From the first order condition with respect to c(t) at t = 0,
u11(c, s)dc+ u12(c, s)ds = 0. (3.9)
Then, given the conditions for the utility function u(c, s), it is immediate to show that
dc
ds
= −u12(c, s)
u11(c, s)
> 0. (3.10)
Proposition 4 is nothing but the complementarity of a household’s utility function be-
tween non-durable goods and durable goods. Note that this complementarity, together with
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intermittent durable goods purchases, can give rise to a lagged response of the aggregate non-
durable consumption∑Hh=1 ch(t) to the aggregate durable goods purchases∑Hh=1 {s′h · 1Th(t)=0}.
Non-durable goods consumption can be peaked right after the peak of durable goods pur-
chases because households that have just purchased durable goods would consume more
non-durable goods with the replenished stock of durable goods.
Proposition 5. Suppose that µ(t) > −ρ for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Then, the borrowing limit
condition is binding such that m′ = m at t = T when a household purchases durable goods.
Proof. The first order condition with respect to the optimal durable goods purchase s′ guar-
antees that the budget constraint is binding such that
λT = e−ρTV2(m′, s′) > 0.
The first order condition with respect to the optimal money balance m′ at t = T is
λT − λm = e−ρTV1(m′, s′).
By substituting into the above equation a smooth pasting condition such that
V1(m′, s′) = lim
(m,s)→(m′,s′)
V1(m, s) = e−
∫ T
0 µ(t)dtλT ,
it is immediate to show that
λm = λT
{
1− exp
(
−ρT −
∫ T
0
µ(t)dt
)}
> 0 given µ(t) > −ρ ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
With Proposition 5, we can manipulate m to examine the effects of financial shocks on
aggregate consumption. For example, a decrease in m can increase aggregate durable goods
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purchases by increasing the number of households simultaneously purchasing durable goods
in the short run. The government can continue to lower m and keep an elevated level of
aggregate consumption by forcing more households to purchase durable goods earlier. Once
it touches the limit and there is no room for lowering m, however, we can guess that the
bunching of households simultaneously purchasing durable goods cannot be sustained and
that a recession derived from the lack of demand should be followed as a reaction of the
expedited, foregone durable goods purchases.
3.3 A Stationary State
Definition 1 (Stationary State). Given the constant inflation rate µ(t) = µ and the corre-
sponding real money transfer τ(t) = τ , an economy is in a stationary state if its aggregate
demand is constant over time such that
d
dt
{
H∑
h=1
ch(t) +
H∑
h=1
sh(t) · 1Th(t)=0
}
= 0 ∀t ≥ 0.
Suppose that an economy is in a stationary state with a constant labor productivity such
that w(t) = w for all t ≥ 0. From Proposition 1, we can rewrite the baseline model as
follows.
V (m, s(0)) = 11− e−ρT · maxT,n(0)
∫ T
0
e−ρt
{
u
(
c(t), e−δts(0)
)
− χn(t)
1+1/ν
1 + 1/ν
}
dt (3.11)
subject to
s(0) ≤ 11− (1− κ)e−δT
{∫ T
0
e−µ(T−t) {wn(t) + τ − c(t)} dt+
(
e−µT − 1
)
m
}
m ≤ 0 given
(3.12)
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where
c(t) = u−11
(
χ
w
n(t)1/ν
∣∣∣∣ s(t) = e−δts(0))
n(t) = eν(µ+ρ)tn(0)
(3.13)
Given the inflation rate µ, the corresponding real money transfer, τ = τ(µ), is pinned down
by the following market clearing condition.
{
1− (1− κ) e−δT
}
s(0) +
∫ T
0
c(t)dt =
∫ T
0
wn(t)dt (3.14)
A stationary state can be used as a bench mark economy. It can be understood as
a long-run equilibrium given parameters. Starting from a stationary state, thus, we can
introduce a shock common to all households and study the effects of the shock on aggregate
consumption.
3.4 Conclusion and Future Research
I develop a model in which each household optimizes its flow of non-durable goods consump-
tion and its timing of durable goods purchase given adjustment costs. A novel feature of
the model is that a household’s labor supply can be pinned down by its optimized timing of
durable goods purchase. Thus, goods market can clear with the endogenous, elastic aggre-
gate labor supply that are determined by the timing distribution of durable goods purchases
across households.
Given the model developed in this paper, a numerical example should be constructed in
order to solve for an equilibrium, which will be the next step of this paper. Then, we can use
the model to study to what extent the extensive margin of aggregate consumption derived
from the heterogeneous timings of durable goods purchases can affect the business cycle. For
instance, the impact of a government policy that expedites durable goods purchases can be
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examined. Some historical observations such as Hausman (2016) might be useful to test the
model.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Pyramidal Business Groups and Wealth Inequal-
ity
The wealth Gini coefficient of an economy with business groups rises first and then declines
as the strength of investor protection (1− τ) improves. See the following Figure A.1.
Figure A.1: Wealth Gini Coefficients
This non-monotonic change in wealth inequality under the prevalence of business groups
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is not a trivial result because by construction, the model intends to feature a rising wealth
inequality with investor protection. Given capital market imperfections, the less financial
frictions allows entrepreneurs to use the more capital in production and to accumulate the
more wealth. Wealth inequality in the model would follow the underlying managerial-talent
inequality generated by a Markov process if no financial frictions existed. Thus, the hump-
shaped Gini coefficients observed in Figure A.1 suggests that business groups hinder the
talented from accumulating wealth as τ goes to zero.
Figure A.2 shows that business groups can lower a upward wealth mobility. It captures
the probability of individuals moving from a = a(6) to a′ ≥ a(13) after ten periods. An
individual of a(6) living in an economy with business groups has a lower probability of being
rich than that in an economy without business groups.
Figure A.2: Upward Wealth Mobility Figure A.3: Downward Wealth Mobility
In contrast, Figure A.3 shows that pyramidal business groups can lower a downward
wealth mobility. However, this effect of lowering the downward wealth mobility decreases
as investor protection improves. Figure A.3 depicts the probability of individuals moving
from a = a(6) to a′ ≤ a(12) after ten periods. Given the observation that the prevalence
of business groups increases abruptly at τ = 0.6 and persists as τ decreases, this rising
downward mobility from τ = 0.5 teaches us that creating a business group as an insurance
87
for the rich becomes less efficient as τ decreases. Remember that the probability of launching
a subsidiary firm is decreasing as τ decreases, which can be seen in Figure 1.7.
With the low upward wealth mobility and the U-shaped downward wealth mobility, busi-
ness groups result in the non-monotonic population of the rich with respect to τ . Figure A.4
captures the population of the rich increases first and then decreases as investor protection
(1 − τ) improves. Note that the population of the rich follows the similar pattern with
the capital stock (Figure 1.11) and with the net aggregate investment (Figure 1.13) in an
economy with business groups. This implies that a lower upward wealth mobility can be a
symptom of inefficiencies pyramidal business groups induce in an equilibrium.
Figure A.4: Population of the Rich
A.2 Auxiliary Results of the Model
Observation 9 (Internal Capital Markets). Let’s define the size of internal capital markets
as the sum of internal equity finance used by all business groups such that
Internal Capital Markets =
∫
o(z,a)=BG
Ea2
[
kC2 (z, a|z2(z, a), a2)
]
dF (z, a). (A.1)
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Then, internal capital markets of business groups are larger than external capital markets if
the degree of financial frictions is moderate (τ ∈ [0.4, 0.6]) or low enough (τ = 0.01).
Figure A.5: Internal Capital Markets Figure A.6: Capital Stock
An economy with business groups features sizable internal capital markets of business
groups growing up early, lasting long. Figure A.5 shows that the internal capital markets
are even bigger and matured earlier than external capital markets given the moderate degree
of financial frictions. As can be seen in Figure A.6, controlling for aggregate output, the
early development of internal capital markets makes the capital in production of an economy
with business groups larger than that of an economy without business groups given the high
degree of financial frictions such that τ ≥ 0.5.1 The faster growth of internal capital markets
suggests that business groups can be good substitutes for underdeveloped external capital
markets in the early stage of an economy where financial frictions are rampant.
Another salient observation is the longevity of internal capital markets of business groups.
Figure A.5 shows that internal capital markets do not monotonically wane as financial fric-
tions decrease. The size of internal capital markets decreases when the degree of financial
frictions decreases from τ = 0.6 to τ = 0.1. However, it increases again when the degree of
financial frictions decreases from τ = 0.1 to τ = 0.01. With low enough financial frictions,
1Each line is connected with two adjacent tunneling ratios such that τ ∈
{0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8}.
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business groups are likely to be financially unconstrained and accumulate corporate savings.
The rebounding internal capital markets in Figure A.5 captures these excessive corporate
savings of business groups.2
Observation 10 (Corporate Savings). Let’s define corporate savings as the sum of assets
that are not used in production but re-invested in external capital markets such that
Corporate Savings =
∫
o(z,a)=SA
{
1− PM(z, a)
}
·
{
−kD(z, a) · 1kE(z,a)>0
}
dF (z, a)
+
∫
o(z,a)=BG
∑
i∈{1,2}
Ea2
[
−kDi (z, a|z2, a2)
∣∣∣PBG(z2(z, a), a2)] dF (z, a).
(A.2)
Then, given the level of aggregate output, the corporate savings of an economy with business
groups are larger than those of an economy without business groups, and the gap of corporate
savings between these two economies is enlarged as the degree of financial frictions decreases.
Figure A.7: Corporate Savings
Given the asymmetric financial advantage of business groups, an economy with business
2See Appendix A.2 for the more detailed description of corporate savings. I define corporate savings as
the assets corporations hold, which are not used in production but re-invested in external capital markets
for risk sharing.
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groups features excessive corporate savings. Figure A.7 shows that corporate savings grow
much faster in an economy with business groups than those in an economy without business
groups do. It also shows that most corporate savings are piled up by business groups.
Corporate savings per se is good for an entrepreneur because the firm’s minimum cash flow
increases with corporate savings in the model. However, the asymmetrically large corporate
savings of business groups can induce factor misallocation in an equilibrium. With smaller
financial frictions (dτ < 0), a business-group entrepreneur can raise more external equity
finance (dkEi > 0), which is used not only to reduce private finance (dkC1 < 0) for more
consumption (dc > 0) but also to increase corporate savings (d(−kD2 ) > 0) for risk sharing,
without increasing capital in production (dki = 0). Thus, the excessive corporate savings of
business groups imply that business-group entrepreneurs can save less (dkC1 < 0) by taking
control of larger external capital (d(kDi + kEi ) > 0). Note that in an economy with business
groups, capital stock (Figure A.6) is shrinking while corporate savings of business groups
(Figure A.7) are soring up as the tunneling ratio τ goes to zero.
Observation 11 (Aggregate Consumption and Investment Rate). Controlling for aggregate
output, aggregate consumption in an economy with business groups is smaller than that in
an economy without business groups, and accordingly the investment rate of an economy with
business groups is higher than that of an economy without business groups.
Figure A.8: Consumption Level Figure A.9: Investment Rate
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Figure A.8 shows that business groups can lower the aggregate consumption and make
it stagnate even though the degree of financial frictions decreases.
The smaller aggregate consumption in an economy with business groups derives from a de-
crease in consumption of stand-alone entrepreneurs. Although the stand-alone entrepreneurs’
population barely changes, their consumption decreases from 0.22 to 0.11 as financial fric-
tions decrease from τ = 0.5 to τ = 0.1. As the share of aggregate consumption, stand-alone
entrepreneurs’ consumption accounts for 24% given τ = 0.5 but only for 12% given τ = 0.1.
This contrasts with the rising consumption share of business-group entrepreneurs: from 13%
to 17%.
Figure A.9 shows that the investment rate of an economy with business groups is sig-
nificantly higher than that of an economy without business groups with τ < 0.4. Since a
stationary equilibrium is employed in the model, the lower consumption level makes a pair
with the higher investment rate. Note that both the lower consumption level and higher
investment rate of an economy with business groups become more salient as the degree of
financial frictions decreases. The declining capital stock of an economy with business groups
in Figure A.6 implies that the rising investment rate depicted in Figure A.9 does not increase
capital stock but is used as flotation costs for propping up pyramidal ownership structures
which can be seen in Figure 1.12.
A.3 Comparing the Model with Literature and Data
Replicating Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011)
Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011) report that the prevalence of family business groups in
a country has strong negative association with the availability of external capital. They
also report a positive but insignificant association between the prevalence of family business
groups and the degree of investor protection. Their observations are replicated by the nu-
92
merical example of the model. Let’s define the prevalence of business groups as the ratio
of the number of business-group firms to the number of firms incorporated, which is the
definition Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011) use in their paper.
First, Figure A.10 shows that business groups initially thrive when severe financial fric-
tions are mitigated and that they are partially disciplined but do not vanish as moderate
financial frictions attenuate. Thus, the degree of investor protection, which is the inverse
of financial frictions, can have a positive but insignificant association with the prevalence of
business groups.
Figure A.10: Prevalence of Business Groups
Figure A.11: Underdeveloped Ext. Cap.
Markets
Second, Figure A.11 shows that the prevalence of business groups moves in opposite
direction with the difference in the size of external capital markets between two economies
with and without business groups. This negative correlation implies that the prevalence
of business groups is significantly associated with the availability of capital in an economy.
Admittedly, the size of external capital markets in the model is not the exact counterpart of
capital availability for stand-alone firms Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011) use in their paper
because the former captures an equilibrium output but the latter captures the supply of
capital.
This negative correlation between business groups and external capital markets can be
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explained by two competing channels. First, business groups can deter the development of
external capital markets. Second, business groups can arise because of the underdevelopment
of external capital markets.
The model developed in this paper suggests that the second channel is dominant with
severe financial frictions and that the first channel is dominant with low enough financial
frictions. Given severe financial frictions, an economy with business groups has larger capital
stock with larger external capital markets than an economy without business groups. In
contrast, given the low degree of financial frictions, an economy with business groups has
smaller capital stock and smaller external capital markets than an economy without business
groups. Since the prevalence of pyramidal business groups does not change in the degree of
financial frictions, these reversals in capital markets imply that the direction of causality for
the negative correlation can be reversed as the degree of financial frictions decreases.
Capital-to-Labor Ratios Within an Industry, South Korea
(a) (b)
Figure A.12: The Distribution of Capital-to-Labor Ratio Within Manufacture from 2010 to
2013
94
(a) (b)
Figure A.13: The Distribution of Capital-to-Labor Ratio Within Non-Finance Service Sector
from 2010 to 2013
Faster Growth of Corporate Savings, Lower Household Consump-
tion, and Higher Consumption of Fixed Capital
I examine three characteristics of an economy with business groups that the model predicts:
faster growth of corporate savings, lower household consumption, and higher consumption
of fixed capital.
First, the model shows that corporate savings in an economy with business groups grow
faster than those in an economy without business groups do when financial frictions atten-
uate. Figure A.14 and Figure A.15 depict annual trends of changes in corporate savings
for 23 countries from 2004 to 2014. The Annual trend of corporate savings for a country is
estimated with changes in corporate-savings ratios, which are non-financial corporate gross
savings divided by gross national disposable income collected from OECD.
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Figure A.14: Annual Trend of Changes
in Corporate Savings for Each Country
Since 2004 (Data is Collected from OECD,
PWT8.1, and Masulis et al. (2011))
Figure A.15: Annual Trend of Changes
in Corporate Savings for Each Country
Since 2004 (Data is Collected from OECD,
PWT8.1, and Masulis et al. (2011))
I assume that the degree of financial frictions has been decreased since 2004 as the global
capital markets have been expanded. I also assume that each country has its own prevalence
of business groups because of country specific environment such as government regulations.
Given the assumptions, the model predicts that corporate savings in a country with the
higher prevalence of business groups grow faster than those in a country with the lower
prevalence of business groups do.
Figure A.14, in which the prevalence of business groups is measured by the relative
number of family and non-family business-group firms, shows that countries with more than
20% of the prevalence tend to have corporate savings growing faster. The average growth
rate of corporate savings in countries with above 20% of business-group firms is 0.15%, and
that in countries with below 20% of business-group firms is almost 0%. Figure A.15, in
which the prevalence of business groups is measured by the relative number of family-group
firms only, shows that there is no strict association between the prevalence of family groups
and the growth rates of corporate savings. The average growth rate of corporate savings in
countries with above 10% of family-group firms is 0.12%, and that in countries with below
96
10% of family-group firms is 0.076%.
Second, the model shows that the consumption level of an economy with business groups
is significantly lower than that of an economy without business groups unless financial fric-
tions are too severe. Figure A.16 and Figure A.17 show that the share of household con-
sumption has negative association with the prevalence of business-group firms within the
group of countries above $30,000 real GDP per capita. Note that the negative correlation
disappears if real GDP per capita is less than $30,000.
Figure A.16: Share of Household Consump-
tion (2004, Current PPPs, Collected from
PWT8.1 and Masulis et al. (2011))
Figure A.17: Share of Household Consump-
tion (2004, Current PPPs, Collected from
PWT8.1 and Masulis et al. (2011))
Because the model predicts significant lower aggregate consumption if an economy dom-
inated by business groups produces higher aggregate output, I divide countries into two
groups, one with real GDP per capita greater than or equal to $30,000 and the other with
real GDP per capita less than $30,000.3 The data of real GDP per capita and the share of
household consumption is collected from Penn World Table 8.1 for 44 countries. I use the
year of 2004 data points because Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011) collect the prevalence of
business groups as of 2004.
Lastly, the model predicts that the consumption of fixed capital is significantly higher in
3Out of 44 countries in the sample, the number of countries with above $30,000 real GDP per capital is
17, and the number of countries with below $30,000 real GDP per capital is 27.
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an economy with business groups than that in an economy without business groups unless
financial frictions are too severe. Figure A.18 and Figure A.19 show that the consumption
of fixed capital is positively associated with the prevalence of business groups and that the
association is stronger within the group of countries above $30,000 real GDP per capita.
Note that the model employs a stationary equilibrium and so that investment in the
model is equivalent to the consumption of fixed capital or capital depreciation. Given that
the model predicts significantly higher investment rates of an economy with business groups
if it produces higher aggregate output, countries are divided into two groups, one with real
GDP per capita greater than or equal to $30,000 and the other with real GDP per capita
less than $30,000.4 Consumption of fixed capital as a share of GDP for 23 countries in 2004
is collected from OECD and real GDP per capita in 2004 is collected from Penn World Table
8.1.
Figure A.18: Consumption of Fixed Capi-
tal (2004, Per Cent of GDP, Collected from
OECD and Masulis et al. (2011))
Figure A.19: Consumption of Fixed Capi-
tal (2004, Per Cent of GDP, Collected from
OECD and Masulis et al. (2011))
4$30,000 real GDP per capita is the median of the sample.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Let’s define φ ∈
[
φ, 1
]
and ν ≤ 1 such that
kC = φa, kD = 1− τ1 + r ν infz′,δ′ [pi(z
′, δ′|z, k)] . (A.3)
Then, a stand-alone entrepreneur running a publicly held corporation solves the following
problem.
L(z, a) = u ((1− φ)a− s)+βEz′,δ′ [V (z′, a′)|z]+λss+λφ(φ−φ)+λν(1−ν)+λσ(σ¯−σ) (A.4)
where
a′ = (1 + r)s+ τpi(z′, δ′|z, k) + (1− σ)(1− τ)
{
pi(z′, δ′|z, k)− ν inf
z′,δ′
[pi(z′, δ′|z, k)]
}
k = φa− kF + 1− τ1 + r
{
σEz′,δ′ [pi(z′, δ′|z, k)] + (1− σ)ν inf
z′,δ′
[pi(z′, δ′|z, k)]
}
φ = k
F
a
.
(A.5)
To simplify notations, let’s suppress arguments of functions and operators unless there is
ambiguity. The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions are as follows. For the optimal
private saving, s,
λss = 0,
λs = u′ ((1− φ)a− s)− (1 + r)βEVa
≥ 0.
(A.6)
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For the optimal private finance, kC = φa,
λφ(φ− φ) = 0,
λφ = a [u′ ((1− φ)a− s)− (1 + r)βEVa]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=λs
−aβE [Va · {−(1 + r) + AB}]
≥ 0
(A.7)
where
A ≡
[
1− 1− τ1 + r
{
σEz′,δ′
[
d
dk
pi(z′, δ′|z, k)
]
+ (1− σ)ν inf
z′,δ′
[
d
dk
pi(z′, δ′|z, k)
]}]−1
B ≡ τ d
dk
pi(z′, δ′|z, k) + (1− σ)(1− τ)
{
d
dk
pi(z′, δ′|z, k)− ν inf
z′,δ′
[
d
dk
pi(z′, δ′|z, k)
]}
.
(A.8)
For the optimal external debt finance, kD = 1−τ1+r ν inf pi,
λν(1− ν) = 0,
λν = (1− σ)1− τ1 + r inf piβE [Va · {−(1 + r) + AB}]
= (1− σ)1− τ1 + r inf piA︸ ︷︷ ︸
= dk
dν
·
 βE [Va · {Epi′ − (1 + r)}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Value of Expected Return
− (1− σ + στ)βE [Va · {Epi′ − pi′}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Cost of Risk
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Expected Value of Investment
≥ 0
(A.9)
where
pi′ ≡ d
dk
pi(z′, δ′|z, k).
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Lastly, given σ > 0, the optimal external equity finance, kE = σ1+r
{
(1− τ)Epi − (1 + r)kD
}
,
satisfies the following conditions.
λσ(σ¯ − σ) = 0,
λσ = (1− τ)βE [Va · {Epi − pi}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=βE
[
Va· da′dσ
∣∣∣
dk(ν,σ)=0
]
>0
Marginal Value of Risk Sharing
Given the Fixed Amount of Capital k
+ 1− τ1 + r (Epi − ν inf pi)A︸ ︷︷ ︸
= dk
dσ
·βE [Va · {Epi′ − (1 + r)− (1− σ + στ)(Epi′ − pi′)}]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=|J |·λν where |J |=| dνdσ |dk(ν,σ)=0= Epi−ν inf pi(1−σ) inf pi>0
≥ 0
(A.10)
Proof. From the Kuhn-Tucker condition for λφ,
λs =
1
a
{λφ + |J |λν} where |J | =
∣∣∣∣∣dνdφ
∣∣∣∣∣
dk(φ,ν)=0
> 0.
Given the assumption that a firm is allowed to invest in a risk-free asset, the external debt
finance kD is only bounded above such that λν ≥ 0. If λν > 0, λs > 0 and the optimal private
saving is bounded below such that s = 0. If λν = 0, λs = λφa and the optimal private saving
and the optimal private finance are undetermined because the marginal costs of them are
aligned such that 1λs>0 = 1λφ>0. Thus, the zero private saving, s = 0, is weakly preferred
and the optimization can be achieved by choosing {φ, ν, σ} with s = 0.
Given Condition 1 and λν ≥ 0, the marginal value of external equity finance is always
greater than zero such that
λσ = (1− τ)βE [Va · {Epi − pi}] +
∣∣∣∣∣dνdσ
∣∣∣∣∣
dk(ν,σ)=0
· λν
> 0.
101
Thus, given σ > 0, the optimal external equity finance is bounded above such that σ = σ¯.
Figure A.20 shows that the optimal external equity finance is binding. Given the en-
trepreneur’s managerial talent and wealth, (z, a), there is a downward sloping curve on which
the marginal expected value of investment is zero such that λν(σ, k(σ, ν), a′(σ, ν)|s, φ) = 0.
From the Proposition 1, the marginal value of external equity finance is always positive on the
curve such that λσ|λν=0 = βE
[
Va · da′dσ
∣∣∣
dk=0
]
= (1− τ)βE [Va · {Epi − pi}] > 0 because of the
positive marginal benefit of risk sharing through external equity finance. The entrepreneur,
thus, sells her firm’s shares as many as possible until the constraint for the external equity
finance is binding such that σ = σ¯SA.
Figure A.20: Risk Sharing and Binding External Equity Finance
Second, Figure A.21 shows how the optimal private saving becomes zero. The risk-
free investment opportunity keeps the marginal opportunity cost of private saving greater
than or equal to that of private finance such that aλs ≥ λφ ≥ 0. Given aλs ≥ λφ, the
indifference curve V = V (φ, s) cuts from below the line of constant marginal opportunity
cost of private saving, λs = λs(c, a′), which is achieved by dc(s, φ) = da′(s, ν(s, φ), k(φ, ν)) =
dk(φ, ν(s, φ)) = 0. Thus, the indifference curve is pushed down until the borrowing constraint
of an entrepreneur is binding such that s = 0.
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Figure A.21: Non-Negative Marginal Expected Value of Investment and Binding Private
Borrowing
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Let’s define φ ∈
[
φ, 1
]
, ν1 ≤ 1, and ν2 ≤ 1 such that
kC1 = φa,
kD1 =
1− τ
1 + r ν1
[
inf
z′1,δ
′
1
[pi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1)] + (1− σ2)
{
(1− τ) inf
z′2,δ
′
2
[pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)]− (1 + r)kD2
}]
,
kD2 =
1− τ
1 + r ν2 infz′2,δ′2
pi [(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)] .
(A.11)
Then, given (z2, wM), a business-group entrepreneur with (z1, a) solves the following problem.
L(z1, a|z2, wM) = u ((1− φ)a− s) + βEz′1,z′2,δ′1,δ′2 [V (z′1, a′)|z1]
+ λss+ λφ(φ− φ) + λkC2
(
kC2 − kF − wM
)
+ λν1(1− ν1) + λν2(1− ν2) + λσ1(σ¯ − σ1) + λσ2(σ¯ − σ2)
(A.12)
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where
a′ = (1 + r)s+ τpi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1)
+ (1− σ1)(1− τ)pi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1)
− (1− σ1)(1− τ)ν1
{
inf
z′1,δ
′
1
[
pi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1)
]
+ (1− σ2)(1− ν2)(1− τ) inf
z′2,δ
′
2
[
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)
]}
+ τpi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2) + (1− σ1 + σ1τ)(1− σ2)(1− τ)
{
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)− ν2 inf
z′2,δ
′
2
[
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)
]}
k∗1 = φa− kF − kC2 +
1− τ
1 + r
{
σ1Ez′1,δ′1
[
pi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1)
]
+ (1− σ1)ν1 inf
z′1,δ
′
1
[
pi(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1)
]}
+ (1− τ)
2(1− σ2)
1 + r σ1
{
Ez′2,δ
′
2
[
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)
]− ν2 inf
z′2,δ
′
2
[
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)
]}
+ (1− τ)
2(1− σ2)
1 + r (1− σ1)ν1(1− ν2) infz′2,δ′2
[
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)
]
k2 = kC2 − kF − wM +
1− τ
1 + r
{
σ2Ez′2,δ′2
[
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)
]
+ (1− σ2)ν2 inf
z′2,δ
′
2
[
pi(z′2, δ′2|z2, k2)
]}
.
(A.13)
The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions are as follows. Let’s suppress arguments of
functions and operators for simplicity unless there is ambiguity. For the optimal private
saving, s,
λss = 0
λs = u′ ((1− φ)a− s)− (1 + r)βEVa
≥ 0.
(A.14)
For the optimal private finance of Firm 1, kC1 = φa,
λφ(φ− φ) = 0
λφ = a [u′ ((1− φ)a− s)− (1 + r)βEVa]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=λs
−aβE [Va · {−(1 + r) + A1B1}]
≥ 0
(A.15)
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where
A1 ≡
[
1− 1− τ1 + r
{
σ1Ez′1,δ′1pi
′
1 + (1− σ1)ν1 inf
z′1,δ
′
1
pi′1
}]−1
B1 ≡ τpi′1 + (1− σ1)(1− τ)(pi′1 − ν1 inf pi′1)
pi′1 ≡
d
dk∗1
pi1(z′1, δ′1|z1, k∗1).
(A.16)
For the optimal external debt finance of Firm 1, kD1 = 1−τ1+r ν1 [inf pi1 + (1− σ2)(1− ν2)(1− τ) inf pi2],
λν1(1− ν1) = 0
λν1 = (1− σ1)
1− τ
1 + r {inf pi1 + (1− σ2)(1− τ)(1− ν2) inf pi2} · βE [Va · {−(1 + r) + A1B1}]
= (1− σ1)1− τ1 + r {inf pi1 + (1− σ2)(1− τ)(1− ν2) inf pi2}A1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
dk∗1
dν1
·
 βE [Va · {Epi′1 − (1 + r)}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Value of Expected Return
− (1− σ1 + σ1τ)βE [Va · {Epi′1 − pi′1}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Cost of Risk
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Expected Value of Investment through Firm 1
≥ 0.
(A.17)
For the optimal external equity finance of Firm 1,
kE1 =
σ1
1 + r
[
(1− τ)Epi1 + (1− τ)(1− σ2)
{
(1− τ)Epi2 − (1 + r)kD2
}
− (1 + r)kD1
]
,
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λσ1(σ¯ − σ1) = 0
λσ1 = (1− τ)βE [Va · {Epi1 − pi1}] + (1− τ)2(1− σ2)βE [Va · {Epi2 − pi2}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=βE
[
Va· da′dσ1
∣∣∣
dk∗1(σ1,ν1)=0
]
>0
Marginal Value of Risk Sharing Through Firm 1 Given Capital (k∗1 ,k2)
+
[
1− τ
1 + r {Epi1 − ν1 (inf pi1 + (1− σ2)(1− τ)(1− ν2) inf pi2)}+
(1− τ)2
1 + r (1− σ2) {Epi2 − ν2 inf pi2}
]
A1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
dk∗1
dσ1
·{βE [Va · {Epi′1 − (1 + r)}]− (1− σ1 + σ1τ)βE [Va · {Epi′1 − pi′1}] }︸ ︷︷ ︸
=|J |·λν1 where |J |=
∣∣∣ dν1dσ1 ∣∣∣dk∗1(σ1,ν1)=0
≥ 0.
(A.18)
For the optimal internal equity finance from Firm 1 to Firm 2, kC2 ,
λkC2 (k
C
2 − kF − wM) = 0
λkC2 = βE [Va · {A1B1 − A12A2A1B1 − A2B2}]
≥ 0
(A.19)
where
A12 ≡ (1− τ)
2(1− σ2)
1 + r
{
σ1
(
Ez′2,δ
′
2
pi′2 − ν2 inf
z′2,δ
′
2
pi′2
)
+ (1− σ1)ν1(1− ν2) inf
z′2,δ
′
2
pi′2
}
A2 ≡
[
1− 1− τ1 + r
{
σ2Ez′2,δ′2pi
′
2 + (1− σ2)ν2 inf
z′2,δ
′
2
pi′2
}]−1
B2 ≡ τpi′2 + (1− σ1 + σ1τ)(1− σ2)(1− τ)(pi′2 − ν2 inf
z′2,δ
′
2
pi′2)
− (1− τ)2(1− σ1)(1− σ2)ν1(1− ν2) inf
z′2,δ
′
2
pi′2.
(A.20)
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For the optimal external debt finance of Firm 2, kD2 = 1−τ1+r ν2 inf pi2,
λν2(1− ν2) = 0
λν2 =
1− τ
1 + r (1− σ2) inf pi2 {τ + (1− τ)(1− σ1)(1− ν1)}A1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
dk∗1
dν2
∣∣∣
dk2(kC2 ,ν2)=0
→0 as τ→0 with ν1=1
· βE [Va · {(Epi′1 − (1 + r))− (1− σ1 + σ1τ)(Epi′1 − pi′1)}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Expected Value of Investment through Firm 1
−1− τ1 + r (1− σ2) inf pi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
dkC2
dν2
∣∣∣∣
dk2=0
·βE [Va · {A1B1 −A12A2A1B1 −A2B2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=λ
kC2
≥ 0.
(A.21)
For the optimal external equity finance of Firm 2, kE2 = σ21+r
{
(1− τ)Epi2 − (1 + r)kD2
}
,
λσ2(σ¯ − σ2) = 0
λσ2 = βE
[
Va · 1− τ1 + r (Epi2 − ν2 inf pi2)
·
{
(−1 +A12A2)A1B1 +A2B2 + {τ + (1− τ)(1− σ1)(1− ν1)} {−(1 + r) +A1B1}
}]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=|J |·λν2 where |J |=
∣∣∣ dν2dσ2 ∣∣∣dk2(ν2,σ2)=0=Epi2−ν2 inf pi2(1−σ2) inf pi2
+ (1− τ)
2
1 + r (1− σ1)ν1(Epi2 − inf pi2)A1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
dk∗1
dσ2
∣∣∣
dk2(ν2,σ2)=0
·βE [Va · {(Epi′1 − (1 + r))− (1− σ1 + σ1τ)(Epi′1 − pi′1)}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Expected Value of Investment through Firm 1
+ βE [Va · (1− τ)(1− σ1 + σ1τ) {Epi2 − pi2}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=βE
[
Va· da′dσ2
∣∣∣
dk∗1=dk2=0
]
Marginal Value of Risk Sharing Through Firm 2 Given Capital (k∗1 ,k2)
≥ 0.
(A.22)
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Proof. From the Kuhn-Tucker condition for λφ,
λs =
1
a
{λφ + |J |λν1} where |J | =
∣∣∣∣∣dν1dφ
∣∣∣∣∣
dk∗1=0
> 0.
Given the assumption that firms are allowed to invest in a risk-free asset, the external debt
finance of Firm 1 is only bounded above such that λν1 ≥ 0. If λν1 > 0, λs > 0 and the
optimal private saving is bounded below such that s = 0. If λν1 = 0, 1λs = 1λφ and the
optimal private saving and the optimal private finance are undetermined unless they are
binding together. Thus, the zero private saving is weakly preferred and the optimization can
be achieved with s = 0.
From the Kuhn-Tucker condition for λν2 ,
λν1 = C · λkC2 +D · λν2 , C,D > 0 given τ > 0.
Since firms are allowed to invest in a risk-free asset, the external debt finance of Firm 2 is
only bounded above such that λν2 ≥ 0. If λν2 > 0, λν1 > 0 and the optimal external debt
finance of Firm 1 is bounded above such that ν1 = 1. If λν2 = 0, 1λν1 = 1λkC2
and the optimal
external debt finance of Firm 1 and the optimal internal equity finance are undetermined
unless they are binding together. Thus, the full external debt finance of Firm 1 is weakly
preferred and the optimization can be achieved with ν1 = 1.
Given Condition 2 and λν1 , λν2 ≥ 0, the marginal values of external equity finance of
Firm 1 and Firm 2 are always greater than zero such that,
λσ1 ≥ βE
Va · da′
dσ1
∣∣∣∣∣
dk∗1=0
 > 0,
λσ2 ≥ βE
Va · da′
dσ2
∣∣∣∣∣
dk∗1=dk2=0
 > 0.
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Thus, the optimal external equity finance is binding such that (σ1, σ2) = (σ¯, σ¯).
The intuition of Proposition 2 is similar to that of Proposition 1. Given the non-negative
value of investment, the risk sharing motive makes an entrepreneur to sell both her shares
of Firm 1 and Firm 1’s shares of Firm 2 as many as possible. Thus, the constraints for the
external equity finance of Firm 1 and Firm 2 are binding.
Moreover, the risk-free investment opportunity of firms makes an entrepreneur to take
advantage of external debt finance of Firm 1 and carry it over into Firm 2. It is entrepreneur’s
relegated saving in the sense that the risk-free cash flow of Firm 2 is diverted out to the
entrepreneur due to financial frictions. Note that financial frictions are required to link λν1
and λν2 . If τ = 0, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are collapsed into λν2 = λkC2 = 0 regardless
of λν1 and the full external debt finance of Firm 1 is not guaranteed anymore.
The following Figure A.22 shows that the borrowing constraint for Firm 1 is binding. The
risk-free investment opportunity of Firm 2 keeps the marginal value of external debt finance
of Firm 1 is greater than or equal to the marginal opportunity cost of internal equity finance
such that λν1 ≥ CλkC2 ≥ 0. Given λν1 ≥ CλkC2 , the indifference curve V = V (ν1, kC2 ) cuts
from above the curve of constant marginal value of external debt finance of Firm 1, λν1 =
λν1(k∗1, a′), which is achieved by dk∗1(ν1, kC2 , ν2(ν1, kC2 ), k2(kC2 , ν2)) = dk2(kC2 , ν2(ν1, kC2 )) =
da′(ν1, ν2(ν1, kC2 ), k∗1, k2) = 0. Thus, the indifference curve is pushed up until the borrowing
constraint of Firm 1 is binding such that ν1 = 1.
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Figure A.22: Non-negative Marginal Expected Value of Investment and Binding External
Debt Finance of Firm 1
A.6 Some Algebra
The following algebra is omitted in the above entrepreneur’s problem for brevity.
A Stand-Alone Entrepreneur’s Problem
From λν ≥ 0,
−(1 + r) + AB = A
[
−(1 + r)A−1 +B
]
= A
[
− (1 + r) + (1− τ) {σEpi′ + (1− σ)ν inf pi′}
+ (1− σ + στ)pi′ − (1− σ)(1− τ)ν inf pi′
]
= A [Epi′ − (1 + r)− (1− σ + στ)(Epi′ − pi′)]
(A.23)
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where
A ≡
[
1− 1− τ1 + r {σEpi
′ + (1− σ)ν inf pi′}
]−1
B ≡ τpi′ + (1− σ)(1− τ) {pi′ − ν inf pi′} .
(A.24)
From λσ ≥ 0,
A−1dk(ν, σ) = 1− τ1 + r (1− σ) inf pidν +
1− τ
1 + r (Epi − ν inf pi) dσ
dν
dσ
∣∣∣∣∣
dk(ν,σ)=0
= −Epi − ν inf pi(1− σ) inf pi
(A.25)
and
da′(ν, σ)|dk=0 = −(1− σ)(1− τ) inf pidν − (1− τ)(pi − ν inf pi)dσ
da′(ν, σ)
dσ
∣∣∣∣∣
dk=0
= −(1− σ)(1− τ) inf pi · dν
dσ
∣∣∣∣∣
dk=0
− (1− τ) (pi − ν inf pi)
= (1− τ)(Epi − ν inf pi)− (1− τ)(pi − ν inf pi)
= (1− τ)(Epi − pi).
(A.26)
In the proof of Proposition 1,
A−1dk(φ, ν) = adφ+ 1− τ1 + r (1− σ) inf pidν
|J | =
∣∣∣∣∣dνdφ
∣∣∣∣∣
dk(φ,ν)=0
= a1−τ
1+r (1− σ) inf pi
.
(A.27)
The line of constant marginal opportunity cost of private saving,
λs = λs(c(s, φ), a′(s, ν(s, φ), k(φ, ν))|σ),
111
is derived by solving for the following system of equations
dc(s, φ) = −ds− adφ = 0
A−1dk(φ, ν) = adφ+ 1− τ1 + r (1− σ) inf pidν = 0
da′(s, ν)|dk=0 = (1 + r)ds− (1− σ)(1− τ) inf pidν = 0
(A.28)
such that
adφ = −ds = −1− τ1 + r (1− σ) inf pidν. (A.29)
Note that da′ = 0 is redundant with dc = dk = 0.
A Business-Group Entrepreneur’s Problem
From λσ1 ≥ 0,
A−11 dk
∗
1(ν1, σ1)
∣∣∣
dk2=0
=
{
1− τ
1 + r (1− σ1) inf pi1 +
(1− τ)2(1− σ2)
1 + r (1− σ1)(1− ν2) inf pi2
}
dν1
+
{
1− τ
1 + r (Epi1 − ν1 inf pi1) +
(1− τ)2(1− σ2)
1 + r (Epi2 − ν2 inf pi2)−
(1− τ)2(1− σ2)
1 + r ν1(1− ν2) inf pi2
}
dσ1
da′(ν1, σ1)
∣∣
dk∗1=dk2=0
=
{
−(1− σ1)(1− τ) inf pi1 − (1− τ)2(1− σ1)(1− σ2)(1− ν2) inf pi2
}
dν1
+
{
−(1− τ)(pi1 − ν1 inf pi1) + (1− τ)2(1− σ2)ν1(1− ν2) inf pi2 − (1− τ)2(1− σ2)(pi2 − ν2 inf pi2)
}
dσ1.
(A.30)
Adding to the bottom equation the upper equation multiplied by (1+r) with taking dk∗1 = 0,
da′|dk∗1=dk2=0 =
{
(1− τ)(Epi1 − pi1) + (1− τ)2(1− σ2)(Epi2 − pi2)
}
dσ1
da′
dσ1
∣∣∣∣∣
dk∗1=dk2=0
=
{
(1− τ)(Epi1 − pi1) + (1− τ)2(1− σ2)(Epi2 − pi2)
}
.
(A.31)
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From λν2 ,
A−12 dk2(kC2 , ν2) = dkC2 +
1− τ
1 + r (1− σ2) inf pi2dν2
dkC2
dν2
∣∣∣∣∣
dk2(kC2 ,ν2)=0
= −1− τ1 + r (1− σ2) inf pi2
(A.32)
and
A−11 dk
∗
1(kC2 , ν2)
∣∣∣
dk2=0
= −dkC2 +
(1− τ)2(1− σ2)
1 + r inf pi2 {−σ1 − (1− σ1)ν1} dν2
dk∗1(kC2 , ν2)
dν2
∣∣∣∣∣
dk2=0
= −A1 dk
C
2
dν2
∣∣∣∣∣
dk2=0
− (1− τ)
2(1− σ2)
1 + r inf pi2 {σ1 + (1− σ1)ν1}A1
= 1− τ1 + r (1− σ2) inf pi2 {τ + (1− τ)(1− σ1)(1− ν1)}A1.
(A.33)
From λσ2 ,
A−11 dk
∗
1(ν2, σ2)
∣∣∣
dk2=0
= −(1− τ)
2(1− σ2)
1 + r {σ1 + (1− σ1)ν1} inf pi2dν2
− (1− τ)
2
1 + r {σ1(Epi2 − ν2 inf pi2) + (1− σ1)ν1(1− ν2) inf pi2} dσ2
A−12 dk2(ν2, σ2) =
1− τ
1 + r (1− σ2) inf pi2dν2 +
1− τ
1 + r (Epi2 − ν2 inf pi2)dσ2.
(A.34)
Adding to the upper equation the bottom equation multiplied by (1 − τ) {σ1 + (1− σ1)ν1}
with taking dk2 = 0,
A−11 dk
∗
1(ν2, σ2)
∣∣∣
dk2=0
= (1− τ)
2
1 + r
[
(Epi2 − ν2 inf pi2) {−σ1 + σ1 + (1− σ1)ν1}
− (1− σ1)ν1(1− ν2) inf pi2
]
dσ2
= (1− τ)
2(1− σ1)ν1
1 + r (Epi2 − inf pi2)dσ2
dk∗1(ν2, σ2)
dσ2
∣∣∣∣∣
dk2=0
= (1− τ)
2(1− σ1)ν1
1 + r (Epi2 − inf pi2)A1.
(A.35)
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By adding up the following two equations with taking dk∗1 = dk2 = 0,
dk∗1(kC2 , ν2, σ2) = −dkC2 −
(1− τ)2
1 + r {σ1(Epi2 − ν2 inf pi2) + (1− σ1)ν1(1− ν2) inf pi2} dσ2
+ (1− τ)
2(1− σ2)
1 + r {−σ1 inf pi2 − (1− σ1)ν1 inf pi2} dν2
dk2(kC2 , ν2, σ2) = dkC2 +
1− τ
1 + r (Epi2 − ν2 inf pi2)dσ2 +
1− τ
1 + r (1− σ2) inf pi2dν2,
(A.36)
we can derive
dν2
dσ2
∣∣∣∣∣
dk∗1=dk2=0
= −(1− σ1 + σ1τ)(Epi2 − ν2 inf pi2) + (1− τ)(1− σ1)ν1(1− ν2) inf pi2(1− σ2) inf pi2 {τ + (1− τ)(1− σ1)(1− ν1)} .
(A.37)
Then, by substituting for dν2
dσ2
∣∣∣
dk∗1=dk2=0
,
da′(ν2, σ2)
dσ2
∣∣∣∣∣
dk∗1=dk2=0
=
{
(1− τ)2(1− σ1)ν1 − (1− σ1 + σ1τ)(1− τ)
}
(1− σ2) inf pi2 · dν2
dσ2
∣∣∣∣∣
dk∗1=dk2=0
+ (1− τ)2(1− σ1)ν1(1− ν2) inf pi2 − (1− σ1 + σ1τ)(1− τ)(pi2 − ν2 inf pi2)
= −(1− τ)2(1− σ1)ν1(1− ν2) inf pi2 + (1− σ1 + σ1τ)(1− τ)(Epi2 − ν2 inf pi2)
+ (1− τ)2(1− σ1)ν1(1− ν2) inf pi2 − (1− σ1 + σ1τ)(1− τ)(pi2 − ν2 inf pi2)
= (1− σ1 + σ1τ)(1− τ)(Epi2 − pi2).
(A.38)
Lastly, the curve of constant marginal value of external debt finance of Firm 1,
λν1 = λν1(k∗1(ν1, kC2 , ν2(ν1, kC2 ), k2(kC2 , ν2)), a′(ν1, ν2(ν1, kC2 ), k∗1, k2(kC2 , ν2))),
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is derived by solving for the following system of equations with taking dk∗1 = dk2 = da′ = 0
A−11 dk
∗
1(ν1, kC2 , ν2) = −dkC2 +
1− τ
1 + r (1− σ1) {inf pi1 + (1− σ1)(1− τ)(1− ν2) inf pi2} dν1
+ (1− τ)
2(1− σ2)
1 + r inf pi2 {−σ1 − (1− σ1)ν1} dν2
A−12 dk2(kC2 , ν2) = dkC2 +
1− τ
1 + r (1− σ2) inf pi2dν2
da′(ν1, ν2) = −(1− σ1)(1− τ) {inf pi1 + (1− σ2)(1− ν2)(1− τ) inf pi2} dν1
− (1− σ2)(1− τ) inf pi2 {(1− σ1 + σ1τ)− (1− σ1)(1− τ)ν1} dν2
(A.39)
such that
dkC2 =
1−τ
1+r (1− σ1) {inf pi1 + (1− σ2)(1− ν2)(1− τ) inf pi2}
τ + (1− σ1)(1− ν1)(1− τ) dν1
= −1− τ1 + r (1− σ2) inf pi2dν2.
(A.40)
Note that da′ = 0 is redundant with dk∗1 = dk2 = 0.
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